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Abstract 
Migration towards Europe has surged over the past few years, overwhelming government 
authorities at the national and EU levels, and fuelling a xenophobic, nationalist, populist 
discourse linking migrants to security threats. Despite positive advances in the courts and 
worthy national initiatives (such as Italy’s Operation Mare Nostrum), the EU’s governance of 
migration and borders has had disastrous effects on the human rights of migrants. These 
effects stem from the criminalisation of migrants, which pushes them towards more 
precarious migration routes, the widespread use of administrative detention and the 
processing of asylum claims under the Dublin system, and now the EU–Turkey agreement. 
Yet, with the right political leadership, the EU could adopt different policies in order to 
develop and implement a human rights-based approach to migration that would seek to 
reconcile security concerns with the human rights of migrants. Such an approach would 
enable member states to fully reap the rewards of a stable, cohesive, long-term migration plan 
that facilitates and governs mobility rather than restricts it at immense cost to the EU, the 
member states and individual migrants. 
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Getting European Migration Governance to Respect 
the Human Rights of Migrants 
François Crépeau and Anna Purkey* 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 92 / May 2016 
Introduction 
To say that the migration movements of 2015 have fundamentally altered the political 
landscape in Europe is an understatement. The arrival of over a million asylum seekers and 
migrants within the EU has triggered an identity crisis for Europe, forcing member states to 
reflect on what it means to be European, what the EU stands for and what their obligations are 
to foreigners, to each other and to the world. The EU and its member states have taken the 
measure of the challenge, but have not yet risen to it. 
The real crisis facing Europe, however, is not a crisis of capacity but one of political leadership. 
Instead of providing a foundation for renewed solidarity and for the development of a 
comprehensive common approach to migration, migratory pressures have sown divisions and 
exacerbated existing tensions among states. Faced with an unprecedented number of incoming 
migrants, the EU’s ideal of free movement is crumbling as ever more member states apply 
unilateral controls at their internal borders. Instead of collaboration, we find recrimination; 
instead of responsibility sharing, we find responsibility shifting. The response in the EU to 
high levels of migrants has included some bright expressions of humanity. Among them have 
been Sweden’s decision to accept all Syrians as refugees as early as 2012, German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel’s decision to set aside the Dublin system and to institute an open-door refugee 
policy, the outpouring of support for asylum seekers from European civil society, as seen at 
train stations in Budapest and Vienna, and in the offers of food, material assistance, shelter 
and support by individuals and groups across Europe.1 Nevertheless, as time wears on and 
migrants continue to arrive, there is a serious risk that tensions will continue to worsen and 
goodwill will be all but replaced by security concerns, fear, racism and xenophobia. 
Before addressing the situation in the EU, we need to change our collective mindset and 
reframe the various issues at stake. We must recognise that migration itself is a natural part of 
human existence; it is not a crime, it is not necessarily a problem and it even has the potential 
to be a solution. According to this conception then, migration governance is not about closing 
off borders, shutting gates and keeping people out, but about opening secure, legal pathways 
for migrants. By governing migration, instead of restricting it through the use of strategies like 
interception and detention, we move from a zero-tolerance attitude to one of harm reduction, 
thereby undercutting the criminal organisations responsible for human smuggling, addressing 
European security concerns and ultimately saving lives. 
                                                   
* François Crépeau is Hans & Tamar Oppenheimer Professor of Public International Law, Faculty of Law, 
McGill University, Director of the McGill Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (2015–20) and United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants (2011–17). Anna Purkey is Gordon F. 
Henderson Postdoctoral Fellow at the Human Rights Research and Education Centre at the University of 
Ottawa. This paper was up to date as of 20 March 2016. 
1 See Louise Osbourne, Pedro Espinosa, Dan Nolan, Laura Secci, Patrick Kingsley, Harriet Grant and 
Maryline Baumard, “Give me your tired, your poor…the Europeans embracing migrants”, The Guardian, 3 
August 2015 (www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/03/europeans-who-welcome-migrants). 
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Based on the 2013 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, in a 
2014 article entitled “Managing migrations at the external borders of the European Union: 
Meeting the human rights challenges”,2 the authors called upon the EU to emphasise mobility 
rather than closure, to adopt a human rights-based framework to migration and to develop an 
enhanced, common policy response to migratory pressures. Despite some positive 
developments, the human rights issues raised in that article largely persist today. The 
continued ineffectiveness and paradoxes of EU border management policies and the lack of a 
coherent, human rights-based approach to migration were vividly demonstrated by the deaths 
of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea in early 2015 and the scenes of hundreds of thousands of 
migrants making their way through Europe, seeking both protection and a better life, yet 
struggling to find food, shelter and assistance. 
Given the EU’s share of global resources and wealth of substantive normative standards, 
recent deaths at sea, the suffering seen at all stages of migration and other human rights issues 
have to be understood as the result of not some kind of powerlessness, but of political will and 
policy choices. The suffering of so many, the tendency for migration to take place 
clandestinely and the rise of inter-state tensions are symptoms of systemic failings within the 
EU border management system: the region is losing control of some mobility routes despite 
sustained investment in ‘securing’ or ‘securitising’ borders. These failings also cut deeper and 
speak of how the EU, its member states and its populations respond to difference and 
diversity. 
At the same time, the costs associated with attempting to sustain the status quo are huge. The 
human costs continue to escalate as migrants die at sea and suffer on a large scale at borders, 
within the EU, as well as in neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the resources lost through 
investing in an ineffective system and not maximising the opportunities to benefit from 
organised migration are significant. 
Written as a follow-up to the article on managing migration, this paper is also based on one of 
the reports of the Special Rapporteur.3 It seeks to explore how migration policies in the EU and 
underlying concepts can be shifted to develop a human rights-based approach that will enable 
the EU to adopt a long-term strategy and to bank on mobility over the next 20 to 25 years, 
thereby increasing its capacity to respond to the significant demographic, economic and social 
challenges that lie ahead for Europe as a whole. 
To this end, this paper is divided into three sections. First, the changes that have characterised 
migration to the EU since the 2013 report are examined, with an emphasis on the steep rise in 
the number of migrants making the journey to Europe and the variety of increasingly 
dangerous migration routes used. It also looks at the commensurate increase in xenophobic 
and nationalist, populist discourse in response to security concerns and recent terrorist attacks 
in Paris. Positive efforts are also outlined, including certain judgments of the European Court 
of Human Rights and the expansion of the rescue-at-sea missions Triton and Poseidon in 
                                                   
2 See François Crépeau and Idil Atak, “Managing migrations at the external borders of the European Union: 
Meeting the human rights challenges”, European Journal of Human Rights, 2014/5, 2014, pp. 591-622, based on 
UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Regional study: Management of the external borders of the European Union and 
its impact on the human rights of migrants, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, 
François Crépeau, A/HRC/23/46, HRC, Geneva, 24 April 2013. 
3 See UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Banking on mobility over a generation: Follow-up to the regional study on 
the management of the external borders of the European Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, A/HRC/29/36, HRC, Geneva, 
8 May 2015. 
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response to a disastrous death toll following the termination of Italy’s Operation Mare 
Nostrum. 
Second, a critical analysis is offered of the EU’s governance of migration and border control in 
relation to the human rights of migrants. This section focuses more specifically on certain key 
features that define the EU’s response to migratory pressures and pose particular risks to the 
human rights of migrants, such as the criminalisation of migration (which in turn pushes 
people towards more precarious migration routes), the widespread use of administrative 
detention and the processing of asylum claims under the Dublin system. Additionally, an 
overview is offered of the specific legislative and policy initiatives that have been adopted in 
2015 in response to the migration ‘crisis’. 
Finally, this paper discusses certain initiatives that have been, or could be taken by the EU in 
order to develop and implement a human rights-based approach to migration that would seek 
to balance the EU’s security concerns with the human rights of migrants. Such an approach 
would enable member states to fully reap the rewards of a stable, cohesive, long-term 
migration plan that facilitates and governs mobility rather than restricts it at immense cost to 
the EU, the member states and individual migrants. 
1. Overview of migration since 2013  
Before 2015, despite the ever-growing number of people on the move, a sustained increase in 
overall migration to Europe from third countries had not been observed. Indeed, the OECD 
estimates that in 2012, the EU experienced a 12% decline in migration involving non-EU 
nationals.4 This relative stagnation in flows to the EU was reflective of the fact that the region 
has broadly deemed migration from third-country nationals to be undesirable and has 
dramatically reduced opportunities for regular migration. 
The direct secondary effects of this approach can be seen in the exponential increase in 
irregular migration and asylum claims, which has emerged as a clear trend since 2013. In the 
third quarter of 2015, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (Frontex) reported that irregular 
migration was at the highest level (617,412 irregular crossings) since 2007, when data started 
to be shared in the context of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN). At the same time, 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) announced that the number of migrants 
and refugees crossing into Europe in 2015 had exceeded a million.5 
Meanwhile, asylum claims have also significantly increased. Having peaked in 1992 (670,000) 
and again in 2001 (424,200), the number of asylum applications within the EU fell to just below 
200,000 in 2006.6 From that relative low point, there was a gradual increase in the number of 
applications until 2012, after which the rate of change quickened considerably as the number 
of asylum seekers rose to over 400,000 in the third quarter of 2015 alone.7 With an estimate of 
over 60 million people displaced, the world is currently experiencing the highest levels of 
                                                   
4 See OECD, “Is migration really increasing?”, Migration Policy Debates, OECD, Paris, May 2014(b). 
5 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top 
One Million in 2015: IOM”, Geneva, 22 December 2015 (www.iom.int/news/irregular-migrant-refugee-
arrivals-europe-top-one-million-2015-iom); see also Frontex, “FRAN Quarterly: Quarter 3 – July-September 
2015”, Frontex, Warsaw, 2015 (frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2015.pdf). 
6 See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World at War: Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 
2014, UNHCR, Geneva, 2015(a) (unhcr.org/556725e69.html). 
7 See Frontex (2015), op. cit. 
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displacement since the end of World War II.8 Within that global context, the proportion of 
those displaced by humanitarian emergencies seeking refuge in the EU is still relatively small, 
even though that number has reached a record million.9 
1.1 Facing the challenges 
In the face of such movements, migration trends in the EU are diverging, with some EU 
member states under substantially more pressure than others. With respect to regular 
migration, countries such as Germany, Finland and France saw increasing flows in 2013, while 
Italy, Spain and Portugal experienced a decrease in inflows of permanent immigrants at that 
time.10 Trends in asylum claims also show divergence. Eurostat figures for the last ten months 
of 2015 show Germany as having received 421,940 applications, while Liechtenstein only 
received 125.11 Similarly, according to Eurostat, the proportion of applications being processed 
by Germany, France and Italy went from approximately 42% in 2010 to 69% in 2015.12 
In making the journey to the EU, migrants face numerous risks. While some migrants seek to 
reach Europe by travelling over land, the vast majority arrive via precarious sea-based 
routes.13 The most commonly used routes in 2015 were the Eastern Mediterranean route and 
the Western Balkan route.14 The dramatic increase in the use of these two routes has tragically 
resulted in large-scale loss of life. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
estimates that 5,393 migrants died or went missing at sea in 2015, with 70% of these fatalities 
occurring in the Mediterranean. Given that in January 2016 alone 284 migrants died making 
the journey to the EU, there is every indication that the use of these routes and the associated 
avoidable deaths of migrants continue at an alarming pace.15 
The trials faced by migrants do not end once they arrive safely in EU countries. Against the 
backdrop of a poor post-crisis economic climate, the rise of nationalist populist parties, the 
horrendous terrorist attacks in Paris (including the Charlie Hebdo killings at the beginning of 
2015 and the coordinated Bataclan attacks of November 2015) and the high number of migrant 
arrivals in the second half of 2015, xenophobia and hate speech have proliferated and even 
become a normalised feature of public discourse. In Germany, a country that has opened its 
doors to record-setting numbers of migrants, over 747 crimes against the country’s refugee 
accommodations were recorded in 2015, including 222 cases where individuals could have 
                                                   
8 See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “2015 likely to break records for forced displacement”, 
UNHCR, Geneva, 18 December 2015(b) (www.unhcr.org/5672c2576.html). 
9 See “Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts”, BBC, 18 February 2016 
(www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911). 
10 See OECD (2014b), op. cit.; see also OECD, International Migration Outlook, chapter 1, OECD, Paris, 2015 
(www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2015_migr_outlook-
2015-en). 
11 See Eurostat (appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do). 
12 Calculations based on figures from Eurostat (ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ 
File:First_instance_decisions_by_outcome_and_recognition_rates,_3rd_quarter_2015.png and 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database). 
13 The IOM reports that since January 2015, 1,086,271 out of 1,121,662 migrants (almost 97%) have arrived by 
sea (migration.iom.int/europe/). 
14 See “Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in graphics”, BBC, 28 January 2016 
(www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911). 
15 See the website of the International Organization for Migration, “Missing Migrants Project” 
(missingmigrants.iom.int/latest-global-figures). 
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been or were injured.16 Anti-migrant sentiment in Germany peaked again after some 200 
complaints were filed by women claiming to have been victims of sexual assault committed 
mostly by men described as being of ‘North African or Arab origin’ during New Year’s Eve 
celebrations in Cologne.17 
In addition to its more criminal incarnations, the increase in xenophobia and anti-migrant 
sentiment has also had political manifestations. Indeed, recent polls give the far-right Sweden 
Democrats party 20% of the vote, which makes it the country’s largest or second-largest party, 
and France’s National Front took 28% of the vote in the first round of regional elections in 
December 2015.18 Right-wing parties with an anti-immigration stance also hold sway in 
Hungary and Poland, while Hungary, Slovenia, FYROM, Bulgaria and Austria among others 
have erected fences along their borders in order to control irregular arrivals.19 In another 
example of questionable political action, recent legislation passed by Danish lawmakers giving 
authorities the power to seize cash, jewellery and other valuables from asylum seekers to help 
cover the government’s expenses invokes bitter reminders of the confiscation of Jewish assets 
by the Nazis during World War II.20 While a rise in xenophobia against migrants has been a 
significant trend across Europe within recent years, the sudden influx of migrants has further 
contributed to the polarisation of public and political sentiment. If unchecked, this xenophobia 
will inevitably affect how migrants and asylum seekers are perceived in Europe and may 
constitute a stumbling block in the development of more progressive policies. 
1.2 Positive developments 
Despite the tensions caused by the surge in migration, a variety of positive developments have 
also taken place in relation to the protection of and respect for the human rights of migrants 
within the EU. At a very human level, the photograph of drowned three-year-old Alan Kurdi 
lying on a beach in Turkey triggered an outpouring of public support for the migrants on a 
scale that few people would have expected. While within days of the photo being published, 
Austrian rail workers were donating their time to drive trains carrying refugees and cheering 
volunteers lined up to greet and feed migrants arriving in Germany, political progress was 
somewhat more sedate.21 
                                                   
16 See “Just four convictions for refugee home attacks”, The Local, 4 December 2015 
(www.thelocal.de/20151204/just-four-convictions-after-wave-of-refugee-attacks). 
17 See “Chaos and Violence: How New Year’s Eve in Cologne Has Changed Germany”, 8 January 2016, 
Spiegel Online International (www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cologne-attacks-trigger-raw-debate-on-
immigration-in-germany-a-1071175.html). 
18 See “The march of Europe’s little Trumps”, The Economist, 12 December 2015 (www.economist.com/ 
news/europe/21679855-xenophobic-parties-have-long-been-ostracised-mainstream-politicians-may-no-
longer-be). 
19 See Vanessa Gera, “Anti-migrant mood deepens in Central Europe after Paris attacks”, The Globe and Mail, 
16 November 2015 (www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/anti-migrant-mood-deepens-in-central-
europe-after-paris-attacks/article27279723/). 
20 See Arwa Damon and Tim Hume, “Denmark adopts controversial law to seize asylum seekers’ valuables”, 
CNN, 26 January 2016 (www.cnn.com/2016/01/26/europe/denmark-vote-jewelry-bill-migrants/). 
21 See, e.g. Frederik Pleitgen and Antonia Mortensen, “Refugees’ long, dangerous journey climaxes in 
Germany”, CNN, 1 September 2015 (www.cnn.com/2015/09/01/europe/refugees-munich-germany/) and 
Emma Graham-Harrison, Patrick Kingsley, Rosie Waites and Tracy McVeigh, “Cheering German crowds 
greet refugees after long trek from Budapest to Munich”, The Guardian, 5 September 2015 
(www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/05/refugee-crisis-warm-welcome-for-people-bussed-from-
budapest). 
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One particular area in which support for migrant rights is evident is in the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Assorted 
judgments in recent years have consistently challenged externalisation practices, ‘the Dublin 
logic’ and immigration detention, and dealt with issues concerning access to social protection. 
For example, in 2015 alone, the European Court of Human Rights issued four judgments 
finding that the conditions of detention in Greece violated the prohibition of inhuman or 
degrading treatment contained in the European Convention on Human Rights.22 
Other institutions have also played a role in raising the profile of migrant rights. Since its 
creation, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has made this one of its priorities. The 
FRA focused its 2014 annual conference on the human rights of migrants, and since January 
2016, it has published monthly updates covering a variety of human rights issues pertaining to 
migrants, including child protection, registration and asylum applications, reception 
conditions and public responses (including racist demonstrations and hate speech).23 At 
Frontex, the Fundamental Rights Officer, Ms Inmaculada Arnaez Fernandez, and her staff 
have made important contributions, including the establishment of a code of conduct for joint 
return operations, the VEGA Children Handbook and the establishment of a mechanism for 
monitoring respect for fundamental rights. 
One of the most critical initiatives related to the protection of migrant rights has been the 
ongoing search and rescue operations provided by both the government of Italy and Frontex 
through the Mare Nostrum and Triton Operations. During approximately one year, from 
October 2013 to October 2014, Italy’s Operation Mare Nostrum reportedly saved more than 
160,000 lives.24 When Italy discontinued the Mare Nostrum initiative in late 2014 due to its cost 
and the failure of other states to provide support (in part owing to the morally twisted 
argument that the search and rescue operation constituted a ‘pull’ factor for migrants), 
substantial concerns were raised about the fate of migrants crossing the Mediterranean.25 
These concerns persisted when Frontex established the Italian initiative’s replacement, 
Operation Triton, with a budget that was a mere fraction of Mare Nostrum’s and a vastly 
reduced mandate that prioritised border control rather than search and rescue, causing 
substantial concern among humanitarian actors. However, following a tragic incident in 
spring 2015 in which an estimated 850 migrants died in a single shipwreck, EU leaders agreed 
to expand Triton’s search and rescue efforts significantly, resulting in a dramatic reduction in 
deaths at sea.26 Finally, in December 2015, Frontex launched the Poseidon Rapid Intervention, 
which will provide additional officers, interpreters and technical equipment to support Greece 
in registering and screening migrants arriving on the Greek Islands. 
                                                   
22 See A.Y. v. Greece (Application no. 58399/11), ECHR 5 November 2015; E.A. v. Greece (Application no. 
74308/10), ECHR 30 July 2015; Lutanyuk v. Greece (Application no. 60362/13), ECHR 25 June 2015; Mahammad 
and others v. Greece (Application no. 48352/12), ECHR 15 January 2015. 
23 See EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), “Regular overviews of migration-related fundamental 
rights concerns”, FRA, Vienna, 2015 (fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-borders/overviews). 
24 See Amnesty International, “Italy: Ending Mare Nostrum search and rescue operation would ‘put lives at 
risk’”, Amnesty International, London, 2014 (ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-
articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-
migrants-in-international-waters.html). 
25 Ibid. 
26 See, e.g. Leila Østerbø, “Who is who in the Mediterranean rescue scene”, Migrant Report, Sliema, 20 June 
2015 (migrantreport.org/infographic-mediterranean-assets/) and Alice Philipson, “Revealed: ‘Dramatic’ fall 
in Mediterranean migrant deaths”, The Telegraph, 10 July 2015. 
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Other positive developments include regular migration initiatives, such as the Blue Card 
system, the third-country Seasonal Workers Directive27 and the draft directive on students and 
researchers. Both the Blue Card system and the draft directive on students and researchers are 
aimed at facilitating the mobility of skilled non-EU/EEA nationals coming to the EU to study 
or work, while the Seasonal Workers Directive addresses the situation of low-skilled migrants 
and covers stays not exceeding three months. It is hoped that the number of migrants using 
such avenues would rise to a level that would allow them to effectively fulfil their purpose. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly given the current situation, are the initiatives 
undertaken by the European Commission. In May 2015, the European Commission adopted 
the European Agenda on Migration, which sets out the Commission’s ideas for a 
comprehensive, coherent and holistic approach to migration, covering both legal and irregular 
migration.28 The Agenda on Migration was subsequently followed by a communication setting 
out priority actions to be taken by the EU in terms of operational measures, budgetary support 
and the implementation of EU law.29 Additionally, the Council proposed measures in May 
2015 to relocate 40,000 people, in July to resettle approximately 22,000 and then in September 
2015 to relocate another 120,000 in clear need of international protection. Unfortunately, as of 4 
February 2016, only 4,522 relocation places had been made available by member states.30 
Despite these positive elements, a clear focus on security and repression continues to structure 
the way in which the EU handles border management. A wholesale, coherent integration of 
the human rights of migrants into European policies is still missing. As discussed below, the 
system continues to be characterised by its complexity, a lack of harmonisation between 
relevant policies and regional and international human rights standards, limited responsibility 
sharing and the absence of the political will needed to initiate the required changes. 
2. The EU’s migration and border management: Still characterised by 
securitisation and repression of irregular migration 
Looking at the situation in Europe at the beginning of 2016, the only possible conclusion is 
that the status quo is not sustainable. The current EU border management system is buckling 
under the pressure of increased irregular migration. As migrants continue to die at sea, and 
large-scale suffering is experienced at each stage of migration, it is clear that the EU does not 
govern migration properly. This lack of control manifests itself in a number of different ways, 
                                                   
27 See Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, 
OJ L 94/375, 28.3.2014.  
28 See European Commission, Communication on a European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240, 
Brussels, 13 May 2015 (ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf). 
29 See European Commission, Communication on Managing the refugee crisis: Immediate operational, 
budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 490, Brussels, 29 
September 2015 (ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/ 
proposal-implementation-package/docs/communication_on_managing_the_refugee_crisis_en.pdf). 
30 See European Commission, “Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism 
(Communicated as of 4 February 2016)”, Brussels, 2016; see also European Commission, “Balancing 
responsibility and solidarity on migration and asylum”, Brussels, 14 August 2015 (ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/e-library/multimedia/publications/index_en.htm#08012624904fdcd4/c_) and also European 
Commission, “European Solidarity: A refugee relocation system”, Factsheet, Brussels, 9 September 2015 
(ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/2_eu_solidarity_a_refugee_relocation_system_en.pdf). 
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raising a wide range of human rights concerns, many of which have persisted since 2013 and 
have gained increasing urgency over the past two years. 
2.1 Precarious routes into the EU and human rights 
As noted above, the use of precarious routes into the EU, first through the central 
Mediterranean Sea and now through the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes, 
has increased dramatically in recent years and resulted in large-scale violations of the right to 
life, as well as significant human rights abuses at all stages of the migratory process. This form 
of migration is driven largely by conflict and poverty (push factors), as well as by 
unacknowledged needs within European labour markets (pull factors). Most of these migrants 
use precarious routes because regular migration opportunities are not available.31 
Organised smuggling rings are profiting from this lack of regular migration channels, staying 
ahead of border control initiatives and facilitating crossings through precarious routes in 
exchange for large payments. Smugglers have consistently displayed a remarkable disregard 
for the dignity, life and rights of migrants, and have systematically exploited those desperate 
to reach safer soil. Commonly, boats carrying migrants to the EU leave from Egypt and Libya 
when using central and Eastern Mediterranean channels; from Morocco and Tunisia when 
using the western Mediterranean; and from Turkey when using the Aegean Sea route.32 Many 
migrants have come an extremely long way, including from the sub-Saharan region, the 
Middle East, Central Asia or the Indian sub-continent. Moreover, these migrants, particularly 
those travelling through the Sahara, are often subjected to horrific forms of violence.33 
When migrants reach their intended country of destination, they often suffer further violations 
of their rights. The FRA has published reports of makeshift camps with extremely poor 
conditions that are run by migrants in Morocco, as well as of migrants locked in small huts by 
smugglers in Turkey, not to speak of the ‘Jungle’ in Calais.34 Smugglers typically charge 
several thousand US dollars per person for boat journeys to the EU, such that families with 
multiple members can pay well in excess of $10,000 to make the trip.35 
                                                   
31  For four years, Syrian refugees were forced to live illegally in the Middle East – unable to access the 
local labour market or education and health services. Many placed their faith in the formal processes 
of resettlement, wrongly trusting that countries such as the UK would eventually provide them with 
a long-term future. ‘If there is a possibility of not putting their families’ lives at risk, they will choose 
that,’ the UN refugee agency’s top official in Jordan told me when I visited in January. ‘If it doesn’t 
work out, then they may make a move.’ And in 2015, once people realised that countries such as 
Britain never would help voluntarily, that’s what they did. They came to Europe anyway. 
Derived from Patrick Kingsley, “The shame of the migrant shed masks a deeper scandal”, The Guardian, 8 
March 2016. See also Human Rights Watch (HRW), Europe’s Refugee Crisis: An Agenda for Action, HRW, 
Brussels, 2015 (www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/16/europes-refugee-crisis/agenda-action). 
32 See, e.g. European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Smuggling of Migrants in Europe and the EU 
Response”, Factsheet, Brussels, 13 January 2015 (europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-3261_en.htm) 
and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Role of Organized Crime in the Smuggling of Migrants from 
West Africa to the European Union, UNODC, Vienna, 2011. 
33 See Amnesty International, Libya is Full of Cruelty: Stories of Abduction, Sexual Violence and Abuse from 
Migrants and Refugees, Amnesty International, London, 2015 
(www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/libya_is_full_of_cruelty.pdf). 
34 See the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Fundamental rights at Europe’s southern sea borders, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013 (fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ 
fundamental-rights-europes-southern-sea-borders-jul-13_en.pdf). 
35 See, e.g. “The Billion-dollar Business of Refugee Smuggling”, Al Jazeera, 15 September 2015 
(www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2015/09/billion-dollar-business-refugee-smuggling-
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The boat trips themselves are perilous, involving very basic vessels that have limited 
navigation systems, are not seaworthy and often have insufficient amounts of food, water, 
fuel, first-aid kits and life jackets. Boats are usually overcrowded, occasionally containing 
more than double the recommended capacity. Once migrants have paid for the journeys, they 
are often forced to go ahead with their plans despite sometimes having second thoughts when 
seeing the vessels. Migrants have reported incidents of boats not having captains, with 
inexperienced migrants being required to navigate, as smugglers do not want to risk being 
caught by the authorities.36 When smugglers are on the boats, incidents of sexual violence and 
slavery against women have been reported. The crossing from North Africa takes, on average, 
between one and three days, but can take significantly longer depending on the boat and the 
maritime conditions. Many boats capsize or go into distress.37 
The search and rescue services provided by Italy unilaterally and by Frontex are a response to 
these alarming trends. In addition, some private and military vessels have saved migrants’ 
lives. Still, as underlined by the International Maritime Organisation, the support provided to 
search and rescue operations by merchant vessels should remain exceptional, and states 
should shoulder the main responsibility for such operations.38 
Although positive efforts to protect migrants’ rights to life have been made, they remain 
insufficient. Major challenges include incoherence in search and rescue zone management, 
tensions between unilateral and regional interventions, disincentives for private and military 
vessels to provide assistance to migrants, limited resource commitments from member states 
and difficulties in establishing disembarkation protocols. 
Search and rescue services are a vital part of addressing the human rights challenges faced by 
migrants trying to reach the EU by precarious routes; however, the root causes of the use of 
these channels must also be examined. A main driver is the lack of regular migration channels 
that reflect the EU’s genuine labour needs and the humanitarian and protection needs of those 
fleeing humanitarian situations. The EU’s collective response to the Syrian crisis exposes a 
remarkably intransigent refusal to offer Syrians any significant migration opportunities in 
practice. Most EU member states have preferred to look the other way, unsurprisingly 
pushing migrants to turn to smugglers. 
Nevertheless, the increased use of the Mediterranean migration routes and the influx of 
migrants seen during the last third of 2015 demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that, 
whatever measures the EU implements, migrants will continue to come to the region, and 
‘sealing’ European borders will be very difficult without resorting to measures violating 
human rights, such as pushbacks or refoulement. The risks that migrants are prepared to take 
to reach safer soil show that border control measures are not an effective disincentive when 
desperate people face situations of war, insecurity, violence and extreme poverty. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
150913113527788.html) and Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime, “Smuggled Futures: 
The dangerous path of the migrant from Africa to Europe”, Global Initiative, Geneva, 2014, and also UNODC 
(2011), op. cit. 
36 See Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (2014), op. cit. 
37 Ibid.; see also UNODC (2011), op. cit. 
38 See, e.g. International Maritime Organisation (IMO), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), “Rescue at Sea: A guide to principles and practice as applied to refugees 
and migrants”, IMO, London, January 2015 (www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/seamigration/ 
Documents/RescueatSeaGuideENGLISH.pdf) and IMO, “Unsafe mixed migration at sea”, IMO, March 2016 
(http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/seamigration/Pages/default.aspx) 
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2.2 Externalisation 
Worrying trends in the use of externalisation techniques have also continued in recent years. 
The EU has adopted the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) as a policy 
framework with significant scope for future migration governance and border control. The 
GAMM comprises a complex array of loosely associated policy and legal mechanisms, as well 
as a number of projects in countries of transit and origin. Mobility partnerships are an 
important tool of the GAMM and have been prominent in the recent dialogue held by the EU 
on its migration and border management. The partnerships address a broad range of issues, 
ranging from development aid to visa facilitation, circular migration programmes and the 
fight against unauthorised migration, including cooperation on readmission. Since 2013, the 
EU has signed mobility partnerships with Azerbaijan, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as 
two Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility with Nigeria and Ethiopia.39 
Overall, the GAMM lacks transparency and clarity on the substantive contexts of its multiple 
and complex elements. Additionally, many agreements reached in the framework of the 
GAMM have weak standing under international law and generally lack monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms; this allows for power imbalances between countries and for the 
politics of the day to determine implementation. Nonetheless, the EU has continued to use the 
GAMM to promote greater ‘security’. There are few signs that mobility partnerships have 
resulted in additional human rights or development benefits, as projects have unclear 
specifications and outcomes. The overriding emphasis on security and the lack of policy 
coherence within the GAMM as a whole generate a risk that any benefits arising from human 
rights and development projects will be overshadowed by the secondary effects of more 
security-focused policies.40 
Readmission agreements are an area of particular concern. Despite protections against such 
practices in EU legislation, pushbacks and refoulement to countries of origin and third 
countries with weak rule of law and poor asylum systems have been conducted under the 
broad auspices of bilateral agreements. The European Court of Human Rights has challenged 
such practices. In 2012, the Court ruled on Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, and held that Italy 
had violated Arts. 3, 4 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights by returning 
Somali and Eritrean migrants travelling by sea back to Libya.41 The argumentation of the 
government of Italy cited the bilateral readmission agreement in place between Italy and 
Libya. The ruling, however, which awarded compensation to the migrants, reflects that 
bilateral agreements cannot be used to justify practices that are incompatible with human 
rights. In 2014, in Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled on the treatment of irregular migrants who had entered Italy from Greece and then had 
been deported back to Greece, with the fear of subsequent deportation to their respective 
                                                   
39 See the website of the European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs, “Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility” (ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/ 
global-approach-to-migration/index_en.htm). 
40 See European Commission, Report on the implementation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 
2012-2013, COM(2014) 96 final, Brussels, 21 February 2014; see also Concord, “Migration and Development: 
Coherence for migration and security. And what about development?”, Spotlight Report 2015 Policy Paper, 
Concord, Brussels, 2015 (www.concordeurope.org/images/publications/ 
SpotlightReport_Migration_2015.pdf).; and also Katharina Eisele, The External Dimension of the EU’s Migration 
Policy, Different Legal Positions of Third-Country Nationals in the EU: A Comparative Perspective, Leiden: Brill 
Nijhoff, 2014. 
41 See Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (Application no. 27765/09), ECHR 23 February 2012. 
FACILITATING MOBILITY AND FOSTERING DIVERSITY  11 
countries of origin.42 It held that both countries had violated Arts. 3 and 13 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and that Italy had violated Art. 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the 
Convention. 
In 2014, the EU launched a pilot project to monitor whether the human rights of returnees are 
respected in Pakistan and Ukraine.43 The project is being implemented by the International 
Organization for Migration with the UNHCR and local partners. Unfortunately, little to no 
information has been released concerning the results of this project. Given the rights in play, 
no one should be returned to any country under the GAMM without effective oversight by a 
post-return mechanism for monitoring human rights. 
2.3 Continuing use of detention as a tool for border control 
Another concerning trend in migration governance is the extensive use of detention. 
According to EU law and Art. 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, deprivation of 
liberty for immigration reasons must only be used as a measure of last resort.44 Nevertheless, 
after making often long, dangerous and arduous journeys to the EU, many irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers find themselves subjected to immigration detention. Detention is also 
commonly used by states when migrants are waiting to be returned, either because of an 
unsuccessful protection claim or because they have been identified through the EURODAC 
fingerprint database as having entered the EU in another country. 
As noted by the European Court of Human Rights, some instances of immigration detention 
in EU member states are in contravention of European and international human rights law 
because such domestic law does not require detention to be reasonable, necessary, 
proportionate and of last resort, or because it is not decided on a case-by-case basis.45 
Additionally, there are a number of human rights concerns relating to the impact of detention. 
Many migrants perceive their treatment as harsh and punitive, despite irregular migration not 
being in any way a criminal act. Prolonged detention without a clear basis has been shown to 
have a devastating effect on migrants’ and asylum seekers’ mental health, for example by 
contributing to post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depression.46 This is frequently 
compounded by unacceptable detention conditions, such as unsanitary toilet and shower 
                                                   
42 See Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece (Application no. 16643/09), ECHR, 21 October 2014. 
43 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), “IOM and Partners to Monitor the Situation of 
Readmitted Migrants”, IOM, Geneva, 4 July 2014 (iom.org.ua/en/home-page/news/iom-and-partners-to-
monitor-the-situation-of-readmitted-migrants.html); see also European Commission, “Annex 1 to the AAP 
2012 part 3 of the Thematic Programme for Cooperation with Third Countries in the Areas of Migration and 
Asylum”, Brussels (ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-migration-pakistan-ukraine-p3-af-
2012_en.pdf). 
44 Under Art. 8 of the Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) and Art. 15 of the Return Directive 
(2008/115/EC), detention should only be used when no other less intrusive measures are available to achieve 
the legitimate objective pursued. 
45 See, e.g. Mathloom v. Greece (Application no. 48883/07), ECHR, 24 April 2012 and European Court of 
Human Rights, “Factsheet – Migrants in Detention”, Strasbourg, 2014 
(www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Migrants_detention_ENG.pdf). 
46 See, e.g. Jesuit Refugee Service – European Regional Office, Becoming Vulnerable in Detention, JRS-Europe, 
Brussels, June 2010 (www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201110/20111014ATT29338/ 
20111014ATT29338EN.pdf) and Katy Robjant, Rita Hassan and Cornelius Katona, “Mental health 
implications of detaining asylum seekers: A systematic review”, British Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 194, No. 4, 
2009, pp. 306-12. 
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facilities and unhygienic kitchens. Plus, there is often a lack of effective access to healthcare, as 
well as to physical and recreational activities.47 
Long periods of immigration detention can also lead to sustained barriers to migrants 
claiming their economic and social rights, even after having been released. UNHCR research 
suggests that detention disempowers migrants who are often keen to work. A sustained 
absence from the labour market and the emotional and mental toll of detention can lead to 
migrants becoming unnecessarily dependent on state-provided support later on.48 
Of particular concern of course is the presence of children in detention facilities. Children are 
usually afforded additional protections by member states, and according to many national 
policies, are not supposed to be detained.49 Yet, if the age of the child is unknown, which is 
common among those without documents or coming from countries that do not have robust 
birth registration systems, they can be detained or kept in reception centres until their age can 
be verified. This can take weeks or months. In some instances, while in detention, children live 
and sleep with adults, without any special accommodation made for their young age and 
without access to education. In others, families are separated in different sections of the 
detention facility according to age and gender. The detention of children, even for short 
periods, can have severe, negative psychological effects. Moreover, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has clearly stated that immigration detention can never ever be in the best 
interest of a child and that families of migrants should not be separated.50 Hence, 
unaccompanied minors and families with children should always benefit from alternatives to 
detention.51 
These alternatives to detention are currently being explored, as evidenced by the FRA’s 
October 2015 report entitled Alternatives to Detention for Asylum Seekers and People in Return 
Procedures, which provides a compilation of crucial resources to promote the use of detention 
alternatives.52 A number of countries have moved towards more open reception facilities, 
particularly for vulnerable migrants such as children and families.53 Two of the countries that 
                                                   
47 See, e.g. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Boat Ride to Detention, HRW, Brussels, 2012 
(www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/18/boat-ride-detention/adult-and-child-migrants-malta) and the “Global 
Detention Project” (www.globaldetentionproject.org). 
48 See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR Comments on the European Commission’s 
amended recast proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down 
standards for the reception of asylum-seekers (COM(2011) 320 final, 1 June 2011)”, UNHCR Bureau for 
Europe, Brussels (www.unhcr.org/513da1cc9.pdf). 
49 See, e.g. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 2020 (2014) – The alternatives to 
immigration detention of children, 3 October 2014, Strasbourg; see also Directive 2008/115/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Directive on common standards and procedures in Member States 
for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (Return Directive), OJ L 348/98, 24.12.2008. 
50 See UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of 
unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of origin, CRC/GC/2005/6, 39th Session, 1 
September 2005. 
51 See, e.g. Rahimi v. Greece (Application no. 8687/08), ECHR 5 April 2011; see also Popov v. France 
(Application nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07), ECHR 19 January 2012. 
52 See EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Alternatives to detention for asylum seekers and people in return 
procedures, FRA, Vienna, October 2015(a) (fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/alternatives-detention-
asylum-seekers-and-people-return-procedures). 
53 See, e.g. Francesca Cancellaro, “The New Face of Italian Immigration Detention: A Retreat from the 
Criminalisation of Migrants”, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, 2015 (www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-
subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2015/03/new-face-italian) and the 
“Global Detention Project” (www.globaldetentionproject.org). 
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have been most criticised for their use of detention, Italy and Greece, have both made reforms 
to their detention policies and practices, and reduced the use of administrative detention 
during the course of 2015. Italy has reduced immigration detention from 18 to 3 months.54 
Following a change in government, Greece pledged in early 2015 to close down immigration 
detention centres and release persons whose detention exceeded six months, to implement 
measures to improve detention conditions and to ensure that detention is used only as a last 
resort.55 
Unfortunately, this progress may be short-lived as recent reports suggest that Greece is under 
pressure from the EU to re-open some of the detention centres previously shut down.56 Thus, 
despite some welcome changes, prolonged immigration detention and the associated negative 
consequences on the human rights of migrants continues in many member states. 
2.4 Access to justice 
The ability to access justice through legal or administrative recourse is a key component of 
ensuring the protection of and the accountability for fundamental rights. In a positive trend, 
many national and regional bodies appear willing to support migrants in fighting for their 
rights; however, systemic barriers to the right to access justice remain in place in many EU 
member states. These barriers act either to impede the provision of justice by institutions or to 
prevent individuals from accessing justice resources. Significant resource constraints make 
member states unwilling to invest in services that facilitate access to justice for migrants, such 
as access to competent lawyers, to legal aid and to translation and interpretation services. The 
migrants’ fear of detection, detention and deportation if they assert their rights to access 
justice presents another crucial barrier. Additionally, substantial inconsistencies in access to 
justice persist depending upon the rights at stake, the type and nationality of the migrants and 
the jurisdiction in question. Finally, a lack of specific rules on courts’ duties to apply sanctions 
or compensation for violations of migrants’ human rights (or both) constitutes another 
important barrier.57 
Concerns about access to justice have been expressed in a number of rulings of the European 
courts. Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Louled Massoud v. Malta (2010) 
and Suso Musa v. Malta (2013) held that the way in which both applicants were treated 
violated Arts. 5(1) and (4) of the European Convention on Human Rights on the basis that not 
all the detention had been legal and proceedings to determine its legality had not been 
adequately implemented.58 Similarly, in June 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
                                                   
54 See the website of Human Rights Watch, “Italy” (www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/italy). 
55 See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR welcomes the envisaged changes in the 
administrative detention of third-country nationals”, 19 February 2015(c) (www.unhcr.gr/nea/ 
artikel/24dcef5d13ebd29a1559fc4d7339ad10/unhcr-welcomes-the-envisaged-changes.html). 
56 See Philip Chrysopoulos, “Greek Gov’t to Change Immigration Policy under EU Pressure”, Greek Reporter, 
30 December 2015 (greece.greekreporter.com/2015/12/30/greek-govt-to-change-immigration-policy-under-
eu-pressure/). 
57 See, e.g. Jeremy McBride, Access to Justice for Migrants and Asylum-seekers in Europe, Report for the European 
Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ), Strasbourg, 24 February 2009 (www.coe.int/t/dghl/ 
standardsetting/equality/03themes/access_to_justice/CPEJ_McBride.pdf) and International Commission of 
Jurists (ICJ), “Undocumented” Justice for Migrants in Italy, ICJ, Geneva, October 2014 
(www.refworld.org/pdf.id/5452554a4.pdf). 
58 See Louled Massoud v. Malta (Application no. 24340/08), ECHR 27 July 2010 and Suso Musa v. Malta 
(Application no. 42337/12), ECHR 23 July 2013. See also E.A. v. Greece (Application no. 74308/10), ECHR 30 
July 2015 and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (Application no. 16483/12), ECHR, 1 September 2015. 
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made a significant ruling in the case of Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi, emphasising that, under EU 
law, a lack of identity papers should not be used to justify extending immigration detention 
and that migrants should have access to justice to challenge such detention.59 Despite state 
resistance and significant barriers, the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
support the assertion that ensuring access to justice for migrants and asylum seekers is a 
critical component of ensuring that their fundamental rights are respected. 
2.5 Fingerprinting and freedom of movement under the Dublin system 
Another major challenge to the EU’s governance of migration is the Dublin system itself. The 
severe restrictions on the movement of asylum seekers under the Dublin system are in sharp 
contrast to the mobility provided to EU citizens through the freedom of movement 
framework. Updated in 2013, the overall purpose of the regime is to ensure that one member 
state is responsible for the examination of an asylum application, to deter multiple asylum 
claims and to determine as quickly as possible the responsible member state to ensure 
effective access to an asylum procedure as well as to ensure procedural safeguards, such as the 
right to information, personal interview and access to remedies. This regime also provides a 
mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management.60 Under the Dublin 
regime, asylum seekers are required to have their claims assessed in the country deemed 
responsible for their entry into EU common territory; most often, it will be the first country of 
entry. Once the fingerprints of asylum seekers are collected, they are then entered into the 
EURODAC database, which is shared among member states. If migrants whose details are 
stored in this database apply for protection in other member states, they are supposed to be 
returned to the country deemed responsible. In fact, the whole system is geared towards 
making frontline countries, such as Italy and Greece, responsible for keeping on their territory 
most asylum seekers and irregular migrants, when it is common knowledge that their 
mechanisms for asylum and refugee status determination are subpar and the economic and 
social integration opportunities meagre. 
Both Italy and Greece, seen by most migrants as merely countries of transit, have faced a huge 
influx of asylum seekers as well as a sustained economic downturn. This has resulted in many 
migrants becoming stuck where there are no jobs available for them, with disastrous results 
for migrants and for the host societies, and has acted as an incentive for many more migrants 
to avoid registration in the first country of entry in order to quickly move on towards another 
EU country. Migrants and asylum seekers are unwilling to provide their identification and 
fingerprints because they do not trust that it serves their best interest in the long term. These 
migrants are right: being stuck in a frontline EU country does not offer them the best prospect 
for positive status determination and economic integration.61 
Troubling reports have emerged about border management officials using force to collect 
fingerprints.62 This practice in turn increases the market for smugglers and encourages the use 
                                                   
59 See Case C-146/14, PPU Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi, Court of Justice of the European Union, 5 June 2014. 
60 See Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA), “Information sheet, Dublin III”, ILPA, London, 
2014. 
61 See Susan Fratzke, Not Adding Up: The fading promise of Europe’s Dublin system, Migration Policy Institute, 
Washington, D.C., 2015. 
62 See, e.g. Yermi Brenner, “Far away, so close: For migrants, reaching Italy is only the start”, Aljazeera 
America, 20 August 2015 (america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/8/20/far-away-so-close-for-migrants-
reaching-italy-is-only-the-start.html); see also “Ministers back use of force to get migrant fingerprints: Home 
Office agrees ‘coercion’ can be used by border officials”, Daily Mail Online, 23 August, 2015 
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of precarious routes across Europe, as migrants seeking protection are forced to do so in an 
irregular way, to avoid detection and forced fingerprinting. It is disconcerting to see that EU 
rules and practices have caused the reappearance of smuggling routes within the EU, when 
such routes had disappeared a quarter-century ago with the establishment of freedom of 
movement. 
The European Commission took note of the issue of forced fingerprinting in 2014. It requested 
information from EU member states on the legal frameworks in place and common practices. 
Some states, such as Greece, Malta and Italy, have legally allowed the use of force if migrants 
resist fingerprinting, while other states, such as Austria and Ireland, have prohibited this 
practice.63 Responses from all governments tend to suggest that migrants and asylum seekers 
are only rarely unwilling to give their fingerprints, while others have said that it is very 
difficult to force a person who fundamentally will not cooperate. Even countries that reported 
migrants being uncooperative at the point of disembarkation, such as Malta, claimed the 
individuals could typically be recalled later for fingerprinting. While these reports by member 
states are encouraging, troubling anecdotal evidence by migrants and frontline workers 
suggests that force has been used in countries of first entry to the EU. Even more troubling are 
reports that, in the face of the huge increase in the number of migrants and asylum seekers 
arriving in Europe and the difficulties associated with registering them in a timely manner, in 
December 2015 the European Commission ordered Italy to use force if necessary to compel 
migrants and asylum seekers to have their fingerprints taken.64 
In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has recently ruled on two significant cases 
in relation to the Dublin logic. As discussed above, in 2014 in Sharifi and Others v. Italy and 
Greece, the Court ruled that both countries had violated Arts. 3 (prohibition of torture) and 13 
(right to a remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Italy’s violation occurred 
as a result of returning a group of Afghan asylum applicants to Greece, while Greece’s 
violation was due to its failure to grant access to the asylum procedure and the existing risk of 
deportation to Afghanistan.65 Similarly, in Tarakhel v. Switzerland, in November 2014, the Court 
ruled on the refusal of Switzerland to examine the asylum application of members of an 
Afghan family and the decision to send them back to Italy without assurances that their rights 
would be protected. The Court held that there had been a violation of Art. 3 of the Convention 
and discussed “systemic deficiencies” in the Italian system.66 In 2011, in M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece, the Court held that Belgium had violated Art. 3 of the Convention by deporting an 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3207490/Ministers-use-force-migrant-fingerprints-Home-Office-agrees-
coercion-used-border-officials.html). 
63 See European Commission, Ad-Hoc Query on EURODAC Fingerprinting, Requested by COM on 10 July 
2012, Compilation produced on 22 September 2014 (ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/border/ 
588_emn_ahq_eurodac_fingerprinting_en.pdf); see also EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA, 
“Fundamental rights implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints for Eurodac”, FRA Focus, FRA, 
Vienna, May 2015(b) (fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2015-fingerprinting-focus-
paper_en.pdf). 
64 See Mark Micallef, “German Police Admit They ‘Can’t Fingerprint All Newcomers Immediately’” Migrant 
Report, Sliema, 16 July 2015 (migrantreport.org/bavaria-police-admits-it-cant-fingerprint-all-newcomers/); 
see also Lisa De Bode, “EU demands Italy use force to fingerprint all refugees”, Aljazeera America, 16 
December 2015 (america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/12/16/eu-demands-italy-use-force-to-fingerprint-all-
migrants.html). 
65 See Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece (Application no. 16643/09), ECHR 21 October 2014. 
66 See Tarakhel v. Switzerland [2014] ECHR 1185, 4 November 2014. 
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Afghan migrant to Greece despite systemic failures in asylum and social protection 
provisions.67 
Alongside this jurisprudence, there are other signs that the Dublin logic is failing and that the 
restrictions to freedom of movement are not sustainable. For example, Frontex has reported 
that EU border states are making significant reforms to detention policies, possibly enabling 
greater freedom of movement and a decrease in successful returns. But perhaps the most 
striking evidence of the failure of the Dublin system is found in the images of thousands of 
migrants walking across Europe to Germany, and in Chancellor Merkel’s assertion to the 
European Parliament that “the Dublin process, in its current form, is obsolete”.68 
2.6 Migrant workers 
The precarious routes to Europe discussed above are mixed migration channels, with migrants 
also risking their lives to seek opportunities because regular channels for low-wage migrant 
workers do not exist or are insufficient. Some progress in opening up economic migration 
channels has been made through the development of the above-mentioned Blue Card system 
and Seasonal Workers Directive. Still, use of the Blue Card among EU member states is low 
and sustained official opportunities for low-skilled migrants are scant. 
Europe has jobs for migrants. Many of these jobs are in the official labour market. One of the 
factors that pushed Chancellor Merkel to open the borders of Germany in the autumn of 2015 
was the advice of the business community that Germany needed migrant workers.69 A very 
interesting report on behalf of several German foundations, including the Volkswagen and 
Siemens foundations, explained very accurately the demographic and labour challenges they 
faced and the need for migrants to come.70 The positive impact of the migration over the past 
two years in Germany, in terms of an uptick in its GDP, has already been documented.71 
But many low-wage migrants are employed in the underground labour markets that we have 
allowed to flourish in certain sectors of our economies that have low profit margins and 
cannot be delocalised; depending on the country, these may include agriculture, construction, 
hospitality, care, fisheries and extraction. 
Agricultural workers in southern Italy work ten-hour days in fields in the summer for €20. 
Domestic workers work 17-hour days six days a week in France for a pittance.72 This pliable 
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International, London, 2012; see also Siliadin v. France (Application no. 73316/01), ECHR 26 October 2005. 
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workforce occupies the socioeconomic slot once occupied by the slaves of yesteryear and by 
industrial workers at the end of the 19th century. 
One must understand the dynamics at work. A considerable number of employers are actually 
calling for more exploitable migrants to come and migrants are responding to the 
opportunities of such underground labour markets. Migrants would not come if it were not 
for such possibilities. 
Unfortunately, the domestic framework on labour law is incapable of regulating such 
underground labour markets and the implementation mechanisms are inadequate: 
unionisation is rare and labour inspections inefficient. Exploitation is rife and migrants are too 
often subjected to intimidation, abuse and violence. Yet migrants often consider that the risk of 
exploitation is worth taking if it gives them the opportunity to set foot in a country where they 
hope to move upwards on the social scale.73 
While the relationship between irregular migration status and labour market abuses is 
complex, the former will tend to increase the vulnerability to the latter. Undocumented 
workers, constrained by circumstances, will perform tasks at great financial, physical and 
psychological cost. Little attention has been given to the impact of EU labour market dynamics 
on pull factors for irregular migration and the suffering of undocumented migrant workers. 
While the human rights implications of using precarious sea routes have been highly visible, 
the suffering experienced by undocumented migrant workers once they arrive in the 
European Union is largely unseen.74 Indeed, migrant workers trying to survive in Europe 
often find themselves subject to racism and discrimination. Labour market-related abuses and 
xenophobia within the overall population are mutually reinforcing. It has been reported that 
employers do not employ even highly skilled foreign workers and that there is a failure to 
maximise the potential of migrant workers within the European Union, with many migrants 
underperforming in the labour market relative to their education, in part because of 
xenophobic attitudes.75 
The unwillingness of EU member states to ratify the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families clearly reflects 
their refusal to be held accountable for human rights abuses against undocumented migrant 
workers.  
2.7 The EU’s policy response to the migrant crisis 
Even as early as the spring of 2015, it was clear that the current policies within the EU would 
not be sufficient to cope with the increase in irregular migration. In an effort to respond 
effectively to what appeared to be a developing emergency situation, the EU adopted a new 
European Agenda on Migration on 13 May 2015.76 This Agenda identifies short-term as well as 
                                                   
73 See, e.g. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Rights on the Line: Human Rights Watch Work on Abuses against 
Migrants in 2010, HRW, Brussels, 11 December 2010 (www.hrw.org/report/2010/12/11/rights-line/human-
rights-watch-work-abuses-against-migrants-2010). 
74 See, e.g. EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Severe labour exploitation: Workers moving within or into 
the European Union, States’ obligations and victims’ rights, FRA, Vienna, 2015(c). 
75 See, e.g. European Network Against Racism (ENAR), Racism and Discrimination in Employment in Europe: 
ENAR Shadow Report 2012-2013, ENAR, Brussels, March 2014 (cms.horus.be/files/99935/ 
MediaArchive/publications/shadow%20report%202012-13/shadowReport_final.pdf). 
76 See European Commission, Communication on a European Agenda on Migration, Brussels, 13 May 2015, 
COM(2015) 240 final; see also the European Commission website, “European Agenda on Migration” 
(ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/index_en.htm). 
18  CRÉPEAU & PURKEY 
medium- and long-term priorities in addressing migration and sets out a range of actions 
necessary to better govern all aspects of migration. The Agenda is built upon four pillars. The 
first pillar is the reduction of incentives for irregular migration and involves addressing root 
causes of irregular and forced displacement in third countries, improving the enforcement rate 
of return of irregular migrants and combating smuggling and trafficking operations in 
cooperation with third countries. The second pillar focuses on border management and 
includes both securing external borders and saving the lives of people trying to cross them. 
The third pillar seeks to support the EU’s duty to protect asylum seekers by adopting and 
implementing a Common European Asylum System and reforming the Dublin system so that 
responsibility for asylum applications is better shared across member states. Finally yet 
importantly, the fourth pillar seeks the development of a new policy on legal migration and 
involves such activities as those outlined in the Labour Mobility Package and the Initiative on 
Skills, as well as revising the Blue Card Directive77 for highly qualified third-country 
nationals.78 
Following the adoption of the European Agenda on Migration, certain actions were taken 
immediately in the context of a first implementation package. In response to the deaths of 
approximately 850 migrants in a single shipwreck in April 2015, one of the most important 
actions taken was to expand the capability and geographical scope, as well as tripling the 
budget, of the Frontex joint Operations Triton and Poseidon. These operations have 
subsequently played an invaluable role in saving the lives of migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean. Member states that were once sceptical about search and rescue operations are 
now willing to support them. The Agenda has definitely invalidated the twisted reasoning 
according to which such operations constituted a ‘pull factor’. 
In addition to this initiative, the EU quickly set up a temporary relocation scheme for 40,000 
migrants and a resettlement plan for 20,000 individuals in clear need of international 
protection in order to respond to the high volume of arrivals and to ensure that the 
responsibility for these arrivals was balanced fairly among EU member states according to 
Art. 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.79 A second implementation 
package in September 2015 adopted a system for the relocation of some 120,000 asylum 
seekers from Italy, Greece and Hungary (however, Hungary refused to participate).80 
Unfortunately, as of 4 February 2016, only 4,522 relocation places had been made available by 
member states.81 The second implementation package also included strengthened provisions 
for combating criminal smuggling networks (with information-sharing strategies), established 
a European list of safe countries of origin and sought to address some of the root causes of 
migration by providing financial assistance to countries through a Trust Fund for Africa, 
among other actions. The second implementation package also included an EU action plan on 
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return, which has as its objective substantially increasing the rate of return of irregular 
migrants, in safety and dignity.82 
Another key component of the EU’s reformed strategy is the use of the hotspot approach to 
governing migration. Hotspots are frontline locations that face disproportionate pressures due 
to migration and are thus in need of additional resources. Once a hotspot is identified, the 
European Asylum Support Office, Frontex, the EU Police Cooperation Agency (Europol) and 
the EU Judicial Cooperation Agency (Eurojust) will work with state authorities to identify, 
register, fingerprint and process incoming migrants, to facilitate the relocation of some 
migrants, and to channel individuals in need of protection into an asylum procedure as 
quickly as possible.83 At this time, hotspots have been identified solely in Greece and Italy, but 
the implementation of this approach could be extended to other countries as needed. While 
nominally intended to assist frontline states, the hotspot approach has also been critiqued as 
having as its purpose the shift of responsibility back onto frontline states after the breakdown 
of the Dublin system over the past year.84 We heard, in February 2016, of four centres being 
opened on Greek Islands, with a fifth one to come.85 The evolution of hotspots will have to be 
closely monitored. If used to identify individuals in order to detect protection needs and offer 
appropriate services, they might succeed at attracting most asylum seekers. If used essentially 
to deter, detain and deport irregular migrants, they will fail, as smuggling routes will bypass 
them. 
The solicitation and allocation of additional funding has also been an important component in 
the EU’s response to the migrant situation throughout 2015. The European Commission has 
proposed amendments to both its 2015 and 2016 budgets, increasing the resources devoted to 
governing migration by €1.7 billion. Member states in turn have committed to match EU 
funding for the UNHCR, the World Food Programme, the EU Regional Trust Fund for Syria, 
the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and other organisations.86 
A third implementation package, the ‘Borders Package’, was presented by the European 
Commission in December 2015. The objective of this package is to implement a common 
approach to border management across the EU territory. To this end, the Borders Package 
calls for the creation of a European border and coast guard, which would share responsibility 
with member states for implementing an integrated approach to border management and 
reinforce the mandate of Frontex.87 This enhanced border service would have monitoring and 
supervisory responsibilities as well as the capacity for rapid border interventions and joint 
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operations with member states. An additional component of the Borders Package is the 
revision of the Schengen Borders Code, which introduces the obligation to carry out 
systematic checks on all persons, including those enjoying the right of free movement, at the 
external borders of member states for the purpose of guarding against threats to public order 
and internal security.88 
Although not part of the Borders Package, as a forerunner of the European coast guard and in 
keeping with the emphasis on securing international borders and deterring human smuggling, 
it was announced in early February 2016 that NATO ships will be deployed to the Aegean Sea 
to provide surveillance and interception. Incidentally, any migrants apprehended by NATO 
ships will be returned to Turkey rather than be taken to any other NATO country.89 Although 
clearly designed to include Turkey – a key NATO member – in the management of the 
external borders of the EU, the operationalisation of such a military operation remains to be 
outlined. What will NATO do that Frontex does not do? When intercepting a migrant boat, 
what will the procedure be? Will they embark migrants on their navy ships as the Italians did 
in Mare Nostrum? If not, what happens? If they do, where will they disembark them? Turkey? 
Greece? To what authority will they transfer them? How will simple pushbacks be prevented? 
How will they treat the migrants on board? How will they identify protection needs? 
And how much will all this cost? One cannot imagine that it will be cheaper than Frontex or 
Italian operations. Such amounts could be applied to much more productive policies, such as 
integration projects in countries of destination and transit, which would benefit all concerned, 
including local populations. 
And how will we know what NATO forces are doing? What civilian oversight mechanisms 
will be in place to ensure the protection of the rights of the migrants during the operation? Or 
is asking NATO to conduct such operations precisely a way to avoid the human rights 
oversight that EU and national legal frameworks have come to impose on national navies and 
on Frontex? 
In 2016, it will be critical that the EU acts decisively to implement its proposed reforms and to 
meet its stated objectives. In particular, despite the already small numbers agreed upon, only a 
tiny number of migrants have been relocated or resettled, leaving much work to be done in the 
coming year, including the development of a long-term EU-wide resettlement and relocation 
system.90 The identification of and continued assistance to hotspot areas will also play a crucial 
role, as will the increased efforts to ensure the effective return of migrants who have been 
denied the right to stay in Europe. Looking forward, the European Commission has identified 
three new initiatives for 2016. The first is to ensure that there is sufficient financial support to 
meet the requirements of the new policies and initiatives. More importantly, however, the 
European Commission has proposed undertaking a reform of the Dublin System and the 
development of a legal migration package that will include a revision of the Blue Card 
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system.91 More than any other strategy or initiative thus far, these proposed revisions will set 
the course for the coming years and determine whether the European Union can withstand the 
pressures of a new migration paradigm. 
Strategies implemented over the last few years have been important in saving lives and 
offering solutions to a limited number of migrants, but have taken place in a context of crisis, 
an atmosphere of moral panic and a situation of emergency. This is unsustainable and not 
conducive to taking the best decisions in view of establishing a principled migration policy 
based on a long-term vision. 
Recent decisions have largely been reactive ‘Band-Aid’ solutions as opposed to truly 
transformative of the migration system in Europe. The past year has seen the disintegration of 
the Dublin logic while, in the EU’s supposedly border-free Schengen area, ever more member 
states are unilaterally imposing border controls.92 Relocation and resettlement schemes agreed 
to in theory have been met by a lack of cooperation and responsibility sharing by EU member 
states. Although there is talk of saving lives, protecting migrants from unscrupulous 
smugglers and offering asylum, the strategies adopted, not to mention the common discourse, 
belie this and suggest that the priority of member states is not human rights, but remains the 
strict control of borders, deflection of responsibility and the prevention of irregular migration 
at almost any cost. Something needs to change. 
The EU–Turkey agreement 
As we were finishing this paper, the EU summit of 17–18 March 2016 adopted the general 
outline of an EU–Turkey agreement on migration controls. The agreement93 calls on Turkey to 
take back, on a fast-track basis, people who travelled irregularly from Turkey to Greece. In 
exchange, Europe would take in Syrian refugees from Turkey who have been properly 
recognised as refugees. The EU would also adopt visa facilitation for Turkish citizens 
travelling to the EU, accelerate the process towards Turkey’s membership in the EU and pay 
Turkey up to €6 billion to help it ‘manage’ migration movements. 
The deal follows the European Commission document issued on 16 March 2016, which offered 
reassurances on the human rights framework:  
[T]he case of each person requesting international protection needs to be assessed 
individually, in line with requirements from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 
according to the parameters laid down in the Asylum Procedures Directive. This can 
be done while also making full use of the possibilities offered by the Directive for 
faster procedures. But let me be crystal clear about this, there can be no ‘blanket 
returns’ and there can be no ‘refoulement’.94 
However, according to the agreement, the individual assessment is limited to evaluating the 
category into which each migrant will be slotted for return to Turkey. If one does not apply for 
asylum in Greece, one will be deemed an irregular migrant and returned to Turkey under a 
new fast-track procedure. If one does apply for asylum in Greece, and one had previously 
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received temporary protection in Turkey, the application will be considered inadmissible, and 
one will be returned to Turkey as the ‘first country of asylum’. If one had not yet received 
temporary protection in Turkey, the asylum application will also be considered inadmissible 
and one will be returned to Turkey as a ‘safe third country’ that can provide sufficient 
protection. We are very far from an individual assessment of protection needs: this is 
effectively a ‘pushback agreement’. 
Turkey certainly deserves help to deal with the nearly three million refugees it has already 
taken in. But Europe is not providing Turkey with billions of euros out of humanitarian 
feelings of solidarity. It is buying a deal whereby Turkey promises to do what it takes to stem 
the migration movement towards Europe. 
Europe cannot shrug off its responsibility for migrants and simply pass the buck to Turkey. 
European member states, once responsible for drafting key international legislation on human 
rights and humanitarian protection, seem to be about to abandon their obligations. For 
political expediency, the agreement involves mass expulsions of migrants and pushbacks at 
sea, without proper individual assessments and asylum procedures, in direct contravention of 
international and European human rights laws. Making Turkey the gatekeeper should not 
absolve Europe from its responsibility of welcoming migrants and refugees and protecting 
their rights. The UNHCR,95 the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants,96 
Human Rights Watch97 and Amnesty International98 have questioned the legality of the deal 
under the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees with its principle of non-refoulement, under 
the European Convention on Human Rights with its prohibition of mass expulsions, as well as 
under general, international human rights law, with its provisions protecting children or 
persons with disabilities for example, or with its principle of access to justice. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of such an agreement remains to be tested. Increasing security and 
closing borders incurs the risk of only increasing the suffering of migrants and encouraging 
them to take even more dangerous journeys with smugglers. Additionally, no one yet knows 
how Turkey will implement the deal. Will it put in place a mass detention mechanism for all 
migrants caught trying to move to Europe? What about the separation of families or the 
determination of the best interest of the child in the case of unaccompanied migrant children? 
Such unresolved questions are vital to the legality and legitimacy of the whole scheme. The 
effective implementation of a border sealing strategy seems to involve a considerable amount 
of violence against innocuous and innocent migrants and refugees; in essence, it seems that 
Europe is paying Turkey to use a violence that would be considered illegal on EU territory. 
                                                   
95 See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR’s reaction to the Statement of the EU Heads 
of State and Government of Turkey, 7 March”, Briefing Notes, UNHCR, Geneva, 8 March 2016 
(www.unhcr.org/56de9e176.html).  
96 See UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, “EU Migration Summit: ‘Some European 
States showing a complete disregard for human rights’– UN expert”, News Release, United Nations, Human 
Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, Geneva, 16 March 2016 
(www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17232&LangID=E).  
97 See Human Rights Watch (HRW), “EU: Turkey Mass-Return Deal Threatens Rights, Would Harm 
Refugees, Undermine EU’s Principles”, Press Release, HRW, Brussels, 15 March 2016 
(www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/15/eu-turkey-mass-return-deal-threatens-rights).  
98 See Amnesty International, “EU-Turkey Summit: EU and Turkish leaders deal death blow to the right to 
seek asylum”, Press Release, Amnesty International, London, 8 March 2016 
(www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/eu-turkey-summit-reaction/).  
FACILITATING MOBILITY AND FOSTERING DIVERSITY  23 
One expects that, very quickly, national and European tribunals will be called upon to analyse 
the legality of the individual decisions taken under such an agreement. It is difficult to see 
how they could approve most of the expulsions towards Turkey. If, as determined in the MSS 
decision by the European Court of Human Rights,99 Greece was not considered a safe country 
for Dublin returns, it is hard to see how Turkey would be considered a safe country for many 
of the refugees who might be returned from Greece. 
3. Developing a human rights-based framework that banks on mobility over a 
generation 
All the human rights concerns discussed above are signs of stress in the EU border 
management and migration systems. They are clear indications that the status quo is simply 
not sustainable. Ignoring these warning signs and pouring more resources into an ineffective 
and paradoxical system of border closure will lead to further, avoidable human suffering, as 
well as wasted resources and lost opportunity costs from not reaping the rewards of organised 
mobility. In contrast, developing a human rights-based framework that tackles the most 
pressing concerns and sustains the political will needed to stay the course of reform over a 
generation will enable the EU to bank on the economic and social benefits of mobility. 
3.1 Developing a human rights-based framework 
Policies and practices governing international migration and border management generally 
involve actions and initiatives based on a combination of four rationales, all relating to states’ 
self-interest: security imperatives, humanitarianism, economic benefits and human rights. The 
nature of a particular system of migration regulation and its objectives will depend on the 
specific balance achieved between these four motivations. In recent years, security rationales 
have dominated internationally. States emphasise the importance of maintaining control over 
their own borders and envisage this control as the capacity to restrict entry and exit under the 
guise of protecting national security. The security rationale is similarly apparent in the focus 
on strategies that seek to combat migrant smuggling (all too often conflated with human 
trafficking), the widespread use of preventative detention and the criminalisation of irregular 
migration. While security concerns are clearly relevant in the regulation of migration, the 
current system has become unbalanced with security considerations often directing the 
development of policy to the exclusion of most other factors, and in spite of fact-based 
evidence disputing both the risks to national security and the effectiveness of security-based 
migration initiatives. 
The second rationale on which migration policies may be based is that of humanitarianism. 
While the dominant focus of a security rationale is on the integrity of the state, humanitarian 
approaches place greater focus on the individual, the subject of migration policy. In this way a 
humanitarian-based approach is consistent with the idea of offering asylum to those in need of 
protection. The problem with a humanitarian-based approach is that, at both a practical and a 
conceptual level, the offer of protection is made at the behest of the state and is understood as 
a privilege, not a right. Traditional humanitarianism is based on charity, not rights, and it is 
centred on a relatively narrow discussion of essential needs.100 
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The third rationale is economic and has mostly been developed by traditional immigration 
countries, such as the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These countries decide which 
migrants can be beneficial to the economy of the country, which professional skills are needed 
by the labour market and what business experience or investment opportunities would 
enhance prosperity. The selection is based essentially on the idea that these persons will 
immediately start contributing to the collective wealth through work, taxes and their own 
wealth. Many migrants are accepted as permanent residents, on their way to becoming 
citizens within a few years. In the last decade, these countries have added important 
programmes of temporary migrant workers who come at the request of specific employers, 
can only stay for a certain number of years and often do not have the possibility of asking for 
permanent residence and citizenship. Again, there is no free mobility in this case.101 
In contrast, a human rights-based approach recognises each individual as a free, self-
determining agent endowed with inherent dignity and rights. This approach adopts a much 
broader focus and is fundamentally concerned with the realisation of the full range of human 
rights that are necessary to a dignified life. Consequently, a human rights-based framework 
requires that efforts be made to identify and address the root causes of inequality and the 
underlying and structural obstacles that constitute impediments to the realisation of rights. 
Moreover, unlike a humanitarian approach, a human rights-based framework is 
fundamentally concerned with issues of justice and injustice, and as a result, includes an 
element of accountability: realising rights also means identifying and holding responsible 
those who hold corresponding duties.102 
The EU has developed such a human rights-based migration system for itself, through the 
implementation of the freedom of movement for European citizens within the common 
territory. The obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights is in the international as 
well as the European human rights system, which applies to all regardless of nationality and 
administrative status.103 The constitutive Treaty on the European Union itself notes that the 
Union “is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights”.104 A human rights-based framework for 
migration would embody these values and ensure the application of these obligations and 
duties to people in vulnerable situations of migration, based on equality and non-
discrimination, the duty to protect and access to justice. 
3.2 Implementing a human rights-based approach to mobility 
The adoption of a human rights-based framework founded on the core principles and 
provisions of international and regional law requires that immediate action be taken to stop 
the widespread suffering at the borders of the EU. More than that, policies and practices must 
be implemented not only to address the current situation but also to prevent, as much as 
possible, its recurrence. Thus, in addition to short-term, immediate actions, medium- and 
                                                   
101 See Bridget Anderson, “Migration, immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious workers”, Work, 
Employment & Society, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2010, p. 300; see also Fay Faraday, Profiting from the Precarious – How 
recruitment practices exploit migrant workers, Metcalf Foundation, Toronto (metcalffoundation.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Profiting-from-thePrecarious.pdf). 
102 See Darcy (2004), op. cit. 
103 See, e.g. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS No. 5. 
104 See the Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version 2012), OJ C 326/01, 26.10.2012, Art. 2. 
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long-term strategies that articulate a shared vision for how the EU can govern mobility over a 
generation are also imperative. 
Streamlining search and rescue 
A key element in a human rights-based approach is the protection of life and the security of 
the person without which most other rights are meaningless. A vital first step is for the EU to 
expand and maintain its search and rescue operations at sea. While these efforts were scaled 
back significantly with the end of the Mare Nostrum Operation, spring 2015 saw renewed and 
additional funding and resources being allocated to Operations Triton and Poseidon. Yet, the 
announcement in February 2016 that NATO ships will join in patrolling the European 
coastline highlights another important factor: it is not only crucial that sufficient resources be 
committed to providing assistance to those in distress at sea, but also that this mandate be 
given priority over merely securing international borders. To this end, to ensure the protection 
of the human rights of migrants, it is critical that the EU respect the principle of non-
refoulement; allow irregular migrants to disembark immediately at the nearest port; provide 
information, care and support to migrants; process asylum claims equitably; and support 
commercial vessels in exceptional circumstances to carry out rescue operations without risk of 
retaliation or harassment for being considered accessories to smuggling operations. The 
priorities within a human rights-based framework should be clear: fighting smuggling 
operations is less important than saving lives. The argument often advanced, according to 
which one should not increase search and rescue capacity in order to avoid encouraging 
smuggling operations, is morally, politically and legally unacceptable when human lives are at 
stake.105 Moreover, if the plan is that migrants rescued at sea are returned immediately to 
Turkey, this will encourage smuggling operations to change their tactics again and try new, 
more costly and dangerous routes, and it will most probably push migrants further 
underground and towards exploitation. 
Opening legal migration channels 
The development of a human rights-based framework goes beyond basic life-saving initiatives 
and protection at sea, however. To address the shortcomings mentioned above, the EU needs 
to take stock of the failure of the Dublin mechanism and develop options for solidarity among 
its member states that recognise the important role that freedom of movement plays in the 
realisation of the human rights and the promotion of human dignity of migrants in Europe. 
Reversing the present logic, asylum seekers should be able to register their asylum claim in the 
country of their choice and the EU should build upon current initiatives and support the 
countries receiving asylum claims with proportionate and adequate financial and technical 
support. Standardising reception conditions and harmonising procedures for determining 
refugee status, while stepping up the creation of alternatives to detention (particularly for 
children) throughout the EU should be a top priority, in order to avoid ‘asylum dumping’ and 
stress on the countries that offer better conditions. 
Developing and implementing a human rights-based framework will also require continued 
commitment and the creation and expansion of many more regular migration channels, 
including resettlement opportunities for refugees. The most effective way to do this is to begin 
a process of opening up regular migration channels to the EU, exploring a range of options. 
                                                   
105 See, e.g. Alan Travis, “UK axes support for Mediterranean migrant rescue operation”, The Guardian, 27 
October 2014 (www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/27/uk-mediterranean-migrant-rescue-plan). 
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First, many people presently crossing the Mediterranean Sea, thanks to smugglers, are 
manifestly in need of international protection, such as most Syrians and Eritreans. One cannot 
expect Syrians to live in camps or cities in Jordan, Lebanon or Turkey indefinitely with no 
prospects for a better life. As we have seen, if no other option is available, refugees will take 
their chances with smugglers in order to provide a better future for themselves and their 
children, as many Europeans have done in similar circumstances in the past. Through 
resettlement programmes for refugees and other options for legal migration, including 
humanitarian visas, humanitarian admission, temporary protection and family reunification, it 
is well within the EU’s means to resettle, from Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, up to three 
million refugees over six years, with the help of UNHCR and civil society organisations, 
according to priority criteria. The distribution of 500,000 refugees per year among 28 countries 
representing almost 500 million inhabitants makes for acceptable annual numbers for each 
country. If we use only the population of each country as a distribution key – and a more 
sophisticated instrument would be necessary – the numbers are indeed reduced: 80,000 for 
Germany (not 800,000 as in 2015), 60,000 for the UK and France, 10,000 for Belgium, 8,000 for 
Austria (not 90,000 as in 2015) and 7,000 for Switzerland. With the help of other countries from 
the Global North and the Global South, the numbers could be reduced or the time lines 
accelerated. 
A properly announced and effectively implemented resettlement programme in the EU for 
500,000 Syrian refugees per year from Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan would have obvious 
advantages, as it would 
 reduce significantly the market for smugglers. Many migrants will not spend €10–20,000 
and risk the lives of their children, if there is a meaningful possibility of regular, safe and 
cheap resettlement available within a reasonable time; 
 allow for all the security checks by intelligence agencies to be made in the transit 
countries with enough time to process such checks; 
 reduce considerably the workload on the mechanisms for refugee status determination 
within the destination countries, since refugee status would be attributed before leaving 
the transit country; 
 send a powerful message of solidarity to transit countries, thus allowing for more 
effective strategic coordination and development cooperation over the long term; 
 provide the opportunity to show the public of destination countries that borders are 
respected, that the authorities are governing this migration properly, that there is no 
‘chaos on the beach’, that reception mechanisms are in place and are not overwhelmed, 
that investments have been made in integration policies, and that the fear-mongering 
discourse of nationalist, populist politicians is based on stereotypes, myths and fantasies; 
and 
 provide opportunities for mainstream politicians to develop a pro-mobility, pro-
migration and pro-diversity discourse, which has been singularly lacking in the past two 
decades. 
In all, reducing arrivals by sea will considerably help the EU regain control of its external 
borders. 
The EU is not overwhelmed by a migrant population that represents less than 0.5% of its 
overall population. With well-organised and coordinated resettlement and integration policies 
in place, the EU can easily absorb half a million refugees per year. Vice Chancellor Sigmar 
Gabriel said that Germany alone could absorb that number every year for a number of 
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years.106 Unfortunately, many EU member states continue to debate whether they can take a 
hundred or so asylum seekers. 
Second, smugglers and exploitative employers are presently facilitating the labour mobility 
that many European labour markets need in order to thrive. By developing and incentivising 
other regular and safe migration channels for workers at all skill levels, including for low-
wage migrants, the EU could streamline the number of migrants coming through irregular 
means. Coupled with entry and exit controls as well as other supporting initiatives, multi-year 
and multi-entry visas could incentivise migrants to come to the EU for work and return to the 
country of origin while respecting visa conditions. For such a plan to be successful, the EU and 
its member states will need to employ tougher labour inspection mechanisms, facilitate the 
representation of migrant workers (whatever their status) by labour unions and fully 
implement the Employers Sanctions Directive (2009/52/EC). Since they act as a magnet for 
irregular migration at the request of exploitative employers, the objective is to considerably 
reduce underground labour markets and exploitation in the workplace over the coming 
decade.107 Long-term investment in enforcement of the labour and human rights of all 
workers, including all migrant workers, whatever their status, will allow the EU to better fill, 
in an efficient and organised way, the inevitable widening of gaps in its labour markets. 
Fully sustaining the implementation of a human rights-based framework for regular migration 
across the EU therefore involves increasing search and rescue capacity; facilitating access to 
justice for migrants; developing alternatives to detention; reinforcing the labour inspection 
mechanisms needed to ensure respect for the rights of all workers in the EU, including 
migrant workers; facilitating the unionisation of migrant workers; setting up massive 
resettlement programmes for refugees; and creating multiple labour-visa opportunities to 
incentivise migrants to use regular migration channels. 
Changing the perceptions about migrants 
The successful implementation of this rights-based policy requires challenging the many 
intersecting and negative perceptions of migrants and migration that have pervaded EU 
debates, discourses, policies and politics. Through fact-based analysis and long-term thinking, 
stakeholders need to reflect on the conceptualisations of migrants and migration that underpin 
counterproductive and ineffective security policies, which result in the criminalisation and 
stigmatisation of migrants, and which have fostered the rise of right-wing nationalist 
populism and xenophobia within the European Union. To achieve this end, it is critical that 
certain data gaps be filled – such as those concerning underground labour markets, labour 
exploitation and deaths at sea – so that evidence-based policies can be enacted. 
As a starting point, the strict conceptual delineation between internal and external migrants, 
demonstrated by the freedom of movement within the Schengen region and the securing of 
external borders, needs to be challenged, as it conflicts with a human rights-based framework 
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for migration that is based on equality, human dignity and non-discrimination. This 
distinction also ignores the potential benefits of mobility and rests on the assumption that 
sealing international borders is possible, which the unsustainable status quo vividly shows is 
not the case. 
The view of migrants among many stakeholders as being ‘illegal’ is counterproductive and is 
not based on facts or the provisions of international law. While migrants who come to the EU 
without documents are in an irregular situation (or ‘undocumented’ or ‘unauthorised’), they 
have not committed a criminal act. The conceptualisation of irregular migrants as illegal has 
undoubtedly played into the use of immigration detention. It has also had an impact on the 
general public’s perception of migrants, legitimising policies that are not in line with human 
rights guarantees and contributing to xenophobia and discrimination. 
Indeed, the criminalisation of irregular migration also has an impact on the realisation of other 
human rights by limiting access to justice and social protection. By characterising irregular 
migrants as ‘illegal’ or ‘criminal’, it becomes both easier and more socially acceptable to limit 
or deny them access to other rights. Facilitating access to justice – without fear of detection, 
detention or deportation – in order to help migrants fight for their rights would go a long way 
towards, on the one hand, legitimising new migration policies by showing that territorial 
sovereignty and human rights are not incompatible, and on the other hand, changing 
mentalities regarding migration by fighting myths, fantasies and stereotypes. 
The common conception that migrants are ‘job stealers’ is one of these harmful fantasies. 
Much economic literature has highlighted how migrants complement rather than compete 
with citizens, thus generating overall productivity gains within the economy.108 A 14-year 
study into the effects of non-EU migration on 15 western European countries showed that by 
taking manual jobs, migrants pushed natives towards more highly skilled and better-paid 
jobs.109 In that study, a significant increase in more complex skills among natives following 
migration was noted. The labour market adjusted with no significant effect on natives’ 
employment rates. The impact of the global recession was shown to diminish but not eradicate 
this positive phenomenon, debunking the argument that an economic downturn justifies 
repressive policies. 
Similarly, conceptions of migrants as ‘burdens’ are not based on reality, nor are they 
productive. Much EU debate focuses on the need to share the ‘burden’ of irregular migration 
across different member states. Against a backdrop of fiscal and demographic challenges in 
many countries and political discourses of austerity, discussing external migration as a burden 
again legitimises the further securing of borders and engenders negative public attitudes. 
While society undoubtedly has a responsibility towards migrants and more solidarity in 
sharing this responsibility is to be encouraged, migration in itself is not and should not be 
presented as a burden. A significant amount of economic literature suggests that, as workers, 
consumers and taxpayers, migrants contribute to the economic growth of societies with very 
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limited downsides.110 In fact, the perceived burden of migration comes predominantly from 
the financial, technological and human resources necessary to implement EU member states’ 
counterproductive security-focused policies and deal with their unintended (although 
foreseeable) secondary effects. Acknowledging that migrants are human beings with rights, 
the EU and its member states should be talking about sharing a responsibility, not a burden. 
The normative basis for more positive, realistic views of migrants lies within an abundance of 
fact-based analysis, as well as the EU’s founding values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights for all, as evidenced in the 
robust human rights regime and the international human rights instruments that member 
states have ratified.111 Integrating these analyses at a political level, as well as within public 
communication and education curricula is a key element both for garnering support for more 
open migration policies and for combating the xenophobia and racism that appears to be 
strengthening its foothold in certain member states. 
Finally, the implementation of a human rights-based approach will require the full recognition 
of the push and pull factors of irregular migration and the EU’s responsibility in governing 
and mitigating them. While certain pull factors, such as the failure to implement returns and 
the existence of underground labour markets, can be addressed in a relatively straightforward 
manner, many push factors are considerably more complex. In particular, the EU should be 
encouraged to use its considerable global influence, including two permanent seats and a non-
permanent one on the Security Council, to press for more effective solutions to the 
humanitarian crises that are prompting this unprecedented human migration, including those 
in Syria, Iraq, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Ukraine. 
Not all migrants arriving on Europe’s shores are in need of refugee protection, even if a 
considerable number are. Even those migrants who do not meet the standard definition of 
refugee and who are often referred to as ‘economic migrants’, without distinguishing between 
Global North expats and undocumented or temporary migrant workers, may in fact be part of 
a larger group of individuals who can be referred to as “survival migrants”.112 Although 
failing to meet the narrow criteria necessary to qualify for refugee protection under 
international law, these individuals may have found themselves in untenable situations where 
their very survival and that of their families were at stake owing to factors such as disasters, 
environmental change, food insecurity, endemic poverty and state fragility. 
The expression ‘survival migrants’ includes all those who saw no other choice but to leave 
their countries, because they cannot feed their family or see no opportunity to offer a different 
future for their children and feel compelled to seek this future abroad. In a sense, refugees and 
survival migrants are in the same boat, quite often literally. 
Survival migrants are not looking for handouts and do not siphon off the social budgets, 
contrary to what many politicians are saying. Migrants come to Europe because there are jobs. 
To say otherwise is simply to bury one’s head in the sand. The EU should help its member 
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states wean themselves from their addiction to ‘cheap labour’ in sectors of their economies 
where huge numbers of migrants with no status or a precarious status are employed, such as 
agriculture, construction, hospitality or caregiving. 
Beyond the worthy initiatives for seasonal workers and the Blue Card, which have yet to be 
implemented in sufficient numbers, EU countries should recognise their real labour needs, 
and establish facilitated, regular migration channels for low-wage work through numerous 
smart visa options. 
3.3 Banking on mobility over a generation 
Applying the EU’s core values to policies that are based on fact rather than on fiction leads to 
migration policies that facilitate mobility and celebrate diversity. The long-term development 
of the human rights-based framework discussed above will become increasingly vital to the 
EU’s internal and external interests. Over the next 25 years, the EU will undergo large-scale 
demographic, societal and labour market changes. 
By 2025, more than 20% of EU citizens will be over age 65, with a particular increase in those 
over 85. The population of elderly people will almost double from 87.5 million in 2010 to 152.6 
million in 2060. It is also expected that the share of those aged 80 and over will rise from 5% to 
12%.113 At the same time, many member states have fertility rates below the rate of 
replacement. An average fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman is estimated to be necessary 
to keep the population at a stable size between generations in developed countries. UN 
population data suggests that between 2010 and 2015, all EU countries will have had average 
fertility rates below the 2.1 mark, with the regional average being 1.6.114 
In line with these demographic changes, the EU workforce is declining. In 2010, for the first 
time, more workers were retiring from the EU labour market than were joining it. The EU and 
OECD are predicting that, with a zero net increase in migration, the working-age population 
will drop by 3.5% by 2020. Over the next 50 years, the working-age population is expected to 
decline by nearly 42 million.115 
These changes have the potential to exacerbate and widen existing skill gaps within the EU. Of 
the companies that responded to the 2013 European Company Survey, 40% stated that despite 
high unemployment levels, they found it difficult to find applicants with the correct skills 
set.116 The demographic shifts discussed above are going to add pressure to the need to ensure 
balance between labour supply and demand. According to both the European Commission 
and OECD, for the EU to meet its 2020 employment targets, it will need to employ a mix of 
policies and reconsider how it utilises the skills of non-EU migrants.117 
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In the context of such shifts, the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training 
has projected that there will mainly be an increase in demand for workers with medium and 
high skill levels and that demand for workers with low skills will decrease. Yet, demand for 
low-skilled workers in 2025 is still projected to be significant, at around 43 million. This figure 
has to be viewed against the EU’s 2020 target of increasing the proportion of citizens gaining a 
tertiary education, as well as the already rapid increases in those doing so. According to the 
Centre, between 2002 and 2013, a 13% increase in the proportion of 30-34 year-olds who have 
attended tertiary education and a 57% increase in the absolute number of tertiary education 
graduates were recorded.118 
Another reason for adopting a human rights-based approach to migration is the EU’s need to 
remain globally competitive. The World Economic Forum has noted diverging trends among 
EU countries. Some, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, are among the 
top-ten most competitive economies in the world, while others lag behind. The highest-
ranking EU country was Germany, in fifth place, and the lowest ranked was Greece, in eighty-
first place.119 There is currently a low level of highly skilled labour migration from non-EU 
countries to most member states owing to barriers to legal access and an informal reluctance 
by employers to hire from outside the region.120 This demonstrates how an approach defined 
by an emphasis on security can permeate all dimensions of migration. 
Well-organised migration and a considerable reduction of the underground labour markets 
would allow member states to properly understand the skill levels of non-EU migrants and 
support realistic strategies for filling labour shortages in order to maintain and build global 
competitiveness. Migrants in irregular situations cannot be assumed to have low skill levels. 
Those who do can still contribute in important ways, given the aim of building the capacity of 
Europeans and the continued projected demand for low-skilled workers. 
A well-organised migration policy based on mobility and human rights could also help the EU 
to enhance its humanitarian and development impacts. In 2013, migrants sent approximately 
$404 billion in remittances, as highlighted in the 2013 report of the Special Rapporteur.121 
Furthermore,  
[r]emittances to developing countries are expected to reach $435 billion in 2015, 
registering a modest growth rate of 2 percent from last year. This represents a 
significant slowing in the growth of remittances from the rise of 3.3 percent in 2014 
and of 7.1 percent per year from 2010-13. Global remittances, sent home from some 250 
million migrants, are projected to grow by 1.3 percent to $588 billion.122  
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Migrants who moved from countries with a low human development index to countries with 
a higher index experienced, on average, a 15-fold increase in income, a doubling in education 
enrolment rates and a 16-fold reduction in child mortality.123 If the human rights of migrants 
are effectively promoted, respected and protected within well-governed migration processes, 
such development outcomes can be greatly enhanced. 
Committing to a generational shift in migration policy that recognises that external mobility 
can mirror the benefits of internal mobility will better equip the EU and its member states to 
deal with these economic, social and demographic changes in a way that sustains recovery, 
encourages growth and further develops global competitiveness. It will also allow the 
European Union to truly promote its founding values in its relations with the rest of the 
world, as envisaged in the Treaty on the European Union. 
It is encouraging to see that the European youth is much more diverse and mobile than the 
previous generations. They have friends from all over the world and are much more sensitive 
to and respectful of differences. Diversity and mobility policies will come to them naturally 
when they take charge 30 years from now. It is going to be a long and painful quarter-century 
if we have to wait for them before the present political deadlock over migration is replaced by 
more sensible policies. 
Conclusions 
The events in the Mediterranean Sea and the mirroring of this suffering across each stage of 
the migratory process over the past four years have clearly shown that the status quo in 
relation to the EU’s approach to border control, asylum and migration is not sustainable in the 
long term. One may fear, however, that the current state of political ‘short-termism’ regarding 
migration may include allowing the mortality rate of migrants at sea to remain high, as it 
allows politicians to present it as a deterrence mechanism, even if this deterrence effect has 
never been proven. The ability of migrants to reach European soil despite a huge investment 
in securing borders demonstrates beyond a doubt that sealing international borders is 
impossible. Migration is a long-standing part of the human condition, and in the globalised 
and conflict-ridden world in which we live it is inevitable. 
The costs of denying this reality are huge. Most significantly, the human costs continue to 
grow. There are no signs that the push and pull factors influencing migratory patterns will 
change or that the many associated human rights abuses will decrease. In addition to the 
human costs, the huge investment of resources by the EU and its member states in ineffective 
and paradoxical border-control mechanisms could be spent in many other ways. 
As immense as these costs are, they are in no way unavoidable. It is not beyond the moral 
agency of the EU to considerably reduce the suffering of large numbers of migrants. The EU’s 
regional system of human rights and other normative standards, its founding values and its 
strong tradition of promoting peace, security and human rights, show that the EU has the 
potential to play a global leadership role on the issue of migration. Claiming this leadership 
role involves the development of coherent and holistic human rights-based approaches that 
require short-, medium- and long-term interventions. It is vital that in the short term, the EU 
step up search and rescue operations, further explore alternatives to detention (particularly for 
children and families), start providing more resettlement opportunities for people from Syria, 
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Iraq, Eritrea and Afghanistan in line with its share of global resources, and take stock of the 
failing Dublin logic and the systemic pressures it is generating. 
While taking these short-term actions would have a significant impact on the human rights of 
migrants, it is important that the EU also take a strategic, long-term view. In the medium term, 
the EU should set up a permanent programme for refugee resettlement, adopt a common 
migration programme that would provide regular migration channels at all skill levels, invest 
in labour inspection and tackle xenophobia, racism and discrimination against migrants. These 
changes need to be sustained over the long term and accompanied by a fundamental 
rethinking of the conceptualisation of migrants, along with the development of integration 
programmes in the context of general diversity policies. 
To achieve lasting success, the EU must consider how its founding principles and normative 
standards apply to those who are not citizens of its member states. It must use fact-based 
analysis and rational, long-term thinking to challenge the many negative conceptualisations 
that underpin current social and policy debates relating to migration within the EU. These 
include the strict delineation between internal and external migrants, the idea of irregular 
migrants being ‘illegal’, the preoccupation with irregular non-EU migration as a ‘burden’ in 
the context of continuing fiscal challenges, and the perception of migrants as being ‘job 
stealers’ who deprive native citizens of economic opportunities. 
The benefits of this rethinking and of the EU taking a leadership role go far beyond the 
fulfilment of normative commitments. Fact-based economic analyses have tended to conclude 
that migrants contribute to economic growth and productivity. As Europe changes over the 
next generation, extending mobility to those outside its borders will enable EU member states 
to reap opportunities for peace, security and sustainable development both within and outside 
the EU. 
  
34  CRÉPEAU & PURKEY 
References  
 
Amnesty International (2012), Exploited Labour: Migrant Workers in Italy’s Agricultural Sector, 
Amnesty International, London. 
––––––––– (2014), “Italy: Ending Mare Nostrum search and rescue operation would ‘put lives 
at risk’”, Amnesty International, London (ecre.org/component/content/article/70-
weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-
will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.html). 
––––––––– (2015), Libya is Full of Cruelty: Stories of Abduction, Sexual Violence and Abuse from 
Migrants and Refugees, Amnesty International, London (www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/ 
default/files/libya_is_full_of_cruelty.pdf).  
––––––––– (2016), “EU Turkey Summit: EU and Turkish leaders deal death blow to the right to 
seek asylum”, Press Release, Amnesty International, London, 8 March 
(www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/EU–Turkey-summit-reaction/).  
Anderson, Bridget (2010), “Migration, immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious 
workers”, Work, Employment & Society, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 300. 
Betts, Alexander (2013), Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Brenner, Yermi (2015), “Far away, so close: For migrants, reaching Italy is only the start”, 
Aljazeera America, 20 August (america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/8/20/far-away-so-
close-for-migrants-reaching-italy-is-only-the-start.html). 
Cancellaro, Francesca (2015), “The New Face of Italian Immigration Detention: A Retreat from 
the Criminalisation of Migrants”, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law 
(www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-
criminologies/blog/2015/03/new-face-italian).  
Card, David (1990), “The impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami labor market”, Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 245-57.  
Chassamboulli, Andri and Giovanni Peri (2015), “The labor market effects of reducing the 
number of illegal immigrants”, Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 792-821. 
Chrysopoulos, Philip (2015), “Greek Gov’t to Change Immigration Policy under EU Pressure”, 
Greek Reporter, 30 December (greece.greekreporter.com/2015/12/30/greek-govt-to-
change-immigration-policy-under-eu-pressure/). 
Concord (2015), “Migration and Development: Coherence for migration and security. And 
what about development?”, Spotlight Report 2015 Policy Paper, Concord, Brussels 
(www.concordeurope.org/images/publications/SpotlightReport_Migration_2015.pdf).  
Crépeau, François and Idil Atak (2014), “Managing migrations at the external borders of the 
European Union: Meeting the human rights challenges”, European Journal of Human 
Rights, 2014/15, pp. 591-622. 
D’Amuri, Francesco and Giovanni Peri (2012), “Immigration, jobs and employment protection: 
Evidence from Europe before and during the Great Recession”, Journal of the European 
Economic Association, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 432-64. 
FACILITATING MOBILITY AND FOSTERING DIVERSITY  35 
Damon, Arwa and Tim Hume (2016), “Denmark adopts controversial law to seize asylum 
seekers’ valuables”, CNN, 26 January (www.cnn.com/2016/01/26/europe/denmark-
vote-jewelry-bill-migrants/). 
Darcy, James (2004), “Human Rights and Humanitarian Action: A review of the issues”, 
Background paper prepared for the workshop on Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Action convened by the IASC Sub-Working Group and co-hosted by UNICEF, the UN 
High Commission for Human Rights and ICVA, Geneva, April. 
De Bode, Lisa (2015), “EU demands Italy use force to fingerprint all refugees”, Aljazeera 
America, 16 December (america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/12/16/eu-demands-italy-
use-force-to-fingerprint-all-migrants.html). 
Dettmer, Markus, Carolin Katschak and Georg Ruppert (2015), “Rx for Prosperity: German 
Companies See Refugees as Opportunity”, Spiegel Online International, 27 August 
(www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-are-an-opportunity-for-the-german-
economy-a-1050102.html). 
Eisele, Katharina (2014), The External Dimension of the EU’s Migration Policy, Different Legal 
Positions of Third-Country Nationals in the EU: A Comparative Perspective, Leiden: Brill 
Nijhoff. 
EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2013), Fundamental rights at Europe’s southern sea 
borders, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
(fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fundamental-rights-europes-southern-sea-borders-
jul-13_en.pdf).  
––––––––– (2015–), “Regular overviews of migration-related fundamental rights concerns”, 
FRA, Vienna (fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-borders/overviews). 
––––––––– (2015a), Alternatives to detention for asylum seekers and people in return procedures, FRA, 
Vienna, October (fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/alternatives-detention-asylum-
seekers-and-people-return-procedures). 
––––––––– (2015b), “Fundamental rights implications of the obligation to provide fingerprints 
for Eurodac”, FRA Focus, FRA, Vienna, May (fra.europa.eu/sites/default/ 
files/fra_uploads/fra-2015-fingerprinting-focus-paper_en.pdf).  
––––––––– (2015c), Severe labour exploitation: Workers moving within or into the European Union, 
States’ obligations and victims’ rights, FRA, Vienna.  
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) (2015a), Skill 
shortages and gaps in European enterprises, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union.  
––––––––– (2015b), “Briefing Note: Europe’s uneven return to job growth”, CEDEFOP, 
Thessaloniki, June (www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/ 
publications/9098).  
European Court of Human Rights (2014), “Factsheet – Migrants in Detention”, Strasbourg 
(www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Migrants_detention_ENG.pdf).  
European Network Against Racism (ENAR) (2014), Racism and Discrimination in Employment in 
Europe: ENAR Shadow Report 2012-2013, ENAR, Brussels, March 
(cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/publications/shadow%20report%202012-
13/shadowReport_final.pdf).  
36  CRÉPEAU & PURKEY 
Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) (2015), 
Immigration Countries: Germany in an International Comparison, 2015 Annual Report, SVR, 
Berlin, February (www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/SVR_ 
Annual-Report-2015_WEB.pdf).  
Faraday, Fay (2014), Profiting from the Precarious – How recruitment practices exploit migrant 
workers, Metcalf Foundation, Toronto (http://metcalffoundation.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Profiting-from-thePrecarious.pdf). 
Foged, Mette and Giovanni Peri (2015), “Immigrants’ effect on native workers: New analysis 
on longitudinal data”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 8961, IZA, Bonn. 
Fratzke, Susan (2015), Not Adding Up: The fading promise of Europe’s Dublin system, Migration 
Policy Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Frontex (2015), “FRAN Quarterly: Quarter 3 – July-September 2015”, Frontex, Warsaw 
(frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2015.pdf).  
Gera, Vanessa (2015), “Anti-migrant mood deepens in Central Europe after Paris attacks”, The 
Globe and Mail, 16 November (www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/anti-migrant-
mood-deepens-in-central-europe-after-paris-attacks/article27279723/). 
Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (2014), “Smuggled Futures: The 
dangerous path of the migrant from Africa to Europe”, Global Initiative, Geneva.  
Graham-Harrison, Emma, Patrick Kingsley, Rosie Waites and Tracy McVeigh (2015), 
“Cheering German crowds greet refugees after long trek from Budapest to Munich”, The 
Guardian, 5 September (www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/05/refugee-crisis-
warm-welcome-for-people-bussed-from-budapest).  
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2010), Rights on the Line: Human Rights Watch Work on Abuses 
against Migrants in 2010, HRW, Brussels, 11 December (www.hrw.org/report/ 
2010/12/11/rights-line/human-rights-watch-work-abuses-against-migrants-2010). 
––––––––– (2012), Boat Ride to Detention, HRW, Brussels (www.hrw.org/report/ 
2012/07/18/boat-ride-detention/adult-and-child-migrants-malta). 
––––––––– (2015), Europe’s Refugee Crisis: An Agenda for Action, HRW, Brussels 
(www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/16/europes-refugee-crisis/agenda-action).  
––––––––– (2016), “EU: Turkey Mass-Return Deal Threatens Rights, Would Harm Refugees, 
Undermine EU’s Principles”, Press Release, HRW, Brussels, 15 March 
(www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/15/EU–Turkey-mass-return-deal-threatens-rights).  
Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) (2014), “Information sheet, Dublin III”, 
ILPA, London. 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) (2014), “Undocumented” Justice for Migrants in Italy, 
ICJ, Geneva, October (www.refworld.org/pdf.id/5452554a4.pdf). 
International Labour Organization (ILO), OECD and World Bank (2015), “The Contribution of 
Labour Mobility to Economic Growth”, Joint paper for the G20 Labour and Employment 
Ministers’ Meeting in Ankara, Turkey 3-4 September 2015, ILO, Geneva 
(www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/ 
publication/wcms_398078.pdf).  
FACILITATING MOBILITY AND FOSTERING DIVERSITY  37 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) (2016), “Unsafe mixed migration at sea”, IMO, 
London, March (www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/seamigration/Pages/ 
default.aspx). 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) (2015), “Rescue at Sea: A guide to 
principles and practice as applied to refugees and migrants”, IMO, London, January 
(www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/seamigration/Documents/RescueatSeaGu
ideENGLISH.pdf). 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2014), “IOM and Partners to Monitor the 
Situation of Readmitted Migrants”, IOM, Geneva, 4 July (iom.org.ua/en/home-
page/news/iom-and-partners-to-monitor-the-situation-of-readmitted-migrants.html).  
––––––––– (2015), “Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One Million in 2015: 
IOM”, Geneva, 22 December (www.iom.int/news/irregular-migrant-refugee-arrivals-
europe-top-one-million-2015-iom).  
Jesuit Refugee Service – European Regional Office (2010), Becoming Vulnerable in Detention, 
JRS-Europe, Brussels, June (www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/ 
201110/20111014ATT29338/20111014ATT29338EN.pdf). 
Kingsley, Patrick (2016), “The shame of the migrant shed masks a deeper scandal”, The 
Guardian, 8 March.  
Maiani, Francesco (2016), “Hotspots and Relocation Schemes: The right therapy for the 
Common European Asylum System?”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 3 
February (eumigrationlawblog.eu/hotspots-and-relocation-schemes-the-right-therapy-
for-the-common-european-asylum-system/). 
McBride, Jeremy (2009), Access to Justice for Migrants and Asylum-seekers in Europe, Report for 
the European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ), Strasbourg, 24 February 
(www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/access_to_justice/CPEJ_Mc
Bride.pdf). 
Micallef, Mark (2015), “German Police Admit They ‘Can’t Fingerprint All Newcomers 
Immediately’” Migrant Report, Sliema, 16 July (migrantreport.org/bavaria-police-
admits-it-cant-fingerprint-all-newcomers/). 
OECD (2014a), “Is migration good for the economy?”, Migration Policy Debates, OECD, Paris, 
May (www.oecd.org/migration/OECD%20Migration%20Policy%20Debates%20 
Numero%202.pdf).  
––––––––– (2014b), “Is migration really increasing?”, Migration Policy Debates, OECD, Paris, 
May. 
––––––––– (2015), International Migration Outlook, chapter 1, OECD, Paris (www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-
2015_migr_outlook-2015-en). 
OECD and European Commission (2014), Matching Economic Migration with Labour Market 
Needs, OECD, Paris.  
Osbourne, Louise, Pedro Espinosa, Dan Nolan, Laura Secci, Patrick Kingsley, Harriet Grant 
and Maryline Baumard (2015), “Give me your tired, your poor…the Europeans 
embracing migrants”, The Guardian, 3 August (www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ 
aug/03/europeans-who-welcome-migrants). 
38  CRÉPEAU & PURKEY 
Østerbø, Leila (2015), “Who is who in the Mediterranean rescue scene”, Migrant Report, 
Sliema, 20 June (migrantreport.org/infographic-mediterranean-assets/).  
Philipson, Alice (2015), “Revealed: ‘Dramatic’ fall in Mediterranean migrant deaths”, The 
Telegraph, 10 July.  
Pleitgen, Frederik and Antonia Mortensen (2015), “Refugees’ long, dangerous journey 
climaxes in Germany”, CNN, 1 September (www.cnn.com/2015/09/01/europe/ 
refugees-munich-germany/).  
Robjant, Katy, Rita Hassan and Cornelius Katona (2009), “Mental health implications of 
detaining asylum seekers: A systematic review”, British Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 194, 
No. 4, pp. 306-12.  
Smith, Helena and Mark Tran (2015), “Germany says it could take 500,000 refugees a year”, 
The Guardian, 8 September (www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/germany-
500000-refugees-a-year-clashes-lesbos). 
Strohecker, Karin (2015), “Deutsche Bank raises German GDP forecast, expecting migrants to 
boost demand”, Reuters, 2 October (www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-economy-
deutschebank-idUSKCN0RW1B720151002).  
Travis, Alan (2014), “UK axes support for Mediterranean migrant rescue operation”, The 
Guardian, 27 October (www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/27/uk-mediterranean-
migrant-rescue-plan). 
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) (2015), World Fertility Patterns 2015, 
UN DESA, New York, NY (www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/ 
publications/pdf/fertility/world-fertility-patterns-2015.pdf).  
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2015a), World at War: Global Trends, Forced 
Displacement in 2014, UNHCR, Geneva (unhcr.org/556725e69.html).  
––––––––– (2015b), “2015 likely to break records for forced displacement”, UNHCR, Geneva, 
18 December (www.unhcr.org/5672c2576.html). 
––––––––– (2015c), “UNHCR welcomes the envisaged changes in the administrative detention 
of third country nationals”, 19 February (www.unhcr.gr/nea/artikel/ 
24dcef5d13ebd29a1559fc4d7339ad10/unhcr-welcomes-the-envisaged-changes.html). 
––––––––– (2016), “UNHCR’s reaction to the Statement of the EU Heads of State and 
Government of Turkey, 7 March”, Briefing Notes, UNHCR, Geneva, 8 March 
(www.unhcr.org/56de9e176.html). 
––––––––– (n.d.), “UNHCR Comments on the European Commission’s amended recast 
proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council laying down 
standards for the reception of asylum-seekers (COM(2011) 320 final, 1 June 2011)”, 
UNHCR Bureau for Europe, Brussels (www.unhcr.org/513da1cc9.pdf).  
UN Human Rights Council (HRC) (2013), Regional study: Management of the external borders of 
the European Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, A/HRC/23/46, HRC, 
Geneva, 24 April. 
––––––––– (2015), Banking on mobility over a generation: Follow-up to the regional study on the 
management of the external borders of the European Union and its impact on the human rights of 
migrants, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François 
Crépeau, A/HRC/29/36, HRC, Geneva, 8 May. 
FACILITATING MOBILITY AND FOSTERING DIVERSITY  39 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2011), The Role of Organized Crime in the Smuggling 
of Migrants from West Africa to the European Union, UNODC, Vienna.  
UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants (2016), “EU Migration Summit: 
‘Some European States showing a complete disregard for human rights’– UN expert”, 
News Release, United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 
Geneva, 16 March (www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx? 
NewsID=17232&LangID=E). 
World Bank (2013), “Migration and Development Brief”, No. 20, World Bank, Washington, 
D.C., 19 April  (siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1110315015165/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief20.pdf).  
––––––––– (2015), “World Bank Forecasts a Slowdown in Migrant Remittances in 2015”, Press 
Release, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 22 October (www.worldbank.org/en/news/ 
press-release/2015/10/22/world-bank-forecasts-a-slowdown-in-migrant-remittances-
in-2015).  
World Economic Forum (WEF) (2014), The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015, WEF, 
Geneva. 
CEPS, Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium  Tel: 32 (0)2 229 39 11 • www.ceps.eu • VAT: BE 0424.123.986 
 
 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, CEPS is widely recognised as the most experienced and authoritative 
think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS acts as a leading forum for debate on EU 
affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research capacity and complemented by an extensive 
network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
 Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today 
 Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
 Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process 
 Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations 
Assets 
 Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts 
 Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach 
 An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Finance 
Regulation 
Rights 
Europe in the World 
Energy and Climate Change 
Institutions 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Energy Climate House (ECH) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
